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Articles
The Bid Challenge Procedures Under the WTO
Government Procurement Agreement: a Critical
Study of the Hong Kong• ExperienceQ1
Henry Gao∗
[Keywords to follow]
1. Introduction
As one of the original contracting parties to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) since
the Tokyo Round, Hong Kong also participated actively in the negotiations to improve the GPA
during the Uruguay Round and joined the new GPA shortly after it entered into force in 1996. In
order to ensure effective enforcement of the obligations, the new GPA explicitly requires Members
to establish a challenge procedure and this has been praised as ‘‘arguably the most innovative aspect’’
of the GPA.1 As explained by Arrowsmith:
‘‘[i]n providing for a detailed system of supplier remedies the GPA marks a departure from the
approach of most other WTO agreements. In general, these do not require affected private
parties to be given a right to enforce WTO rules, but rely mainly on inter-governmental
enforcement. Private challenge procedures are required under some of these provisions, but
none go as far as the GPA. In particular, their procedural requirements and obligations on
remedies are not as detailed or stringent as those of the GPA and they generally give greater
deference to states’ own national traditions of review in the particular area concerned.’’2
∗ LLM, London; JD, Vanderbilt. Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law; Deputy Director, East Asia International Economic
Law and Policy (EAIEL) Program, The University of Hong Kong. This article benefits from the generous support provided
by the Seed Funding for Basic Research at The University of Hong Kong. The author is most grateful for the Secretariat
of the Review Body on Bid Challenges within the Trade and Industry Department of Hong Kong, which kindly provided
the author with the Panel reports of the Review Body. The author also wishes to thank Professor Sue Arrowsmith and
the anonymous reviewer of the P.P.L.R. for their most helpful comments. Even though the author is currently a Member
of the Review Body on Bid Challenges of Hong Kong, this article was mostly completed before the author’s appointment
to the Review Body. Thus, all views made in this article are the author’s own and should not be attributed to the Review
Body or the Hong Kong Government. The author can be reached by email at gaohenry@gmail.com.
1 B.M. Hoekman and P.C. Mavroidis, ‘‘Basic Elements of the Agreement on Government Procurement’’, in B.M. Hoekman
and P.C. Mavroidis (eds) Law and Policy in Public Purchasing: The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, (Michigan:
Ann Arbor, 1997), p.20.
2 Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO (Kluwer, The Hague, 2003), p.385.
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While there has been an extensive literature on the challenge procedure of the GPA in general,3 as
well as excellent country studies on the operation of the national challenge procedures of several key
GPA Members,4 no such study has been conducted for Hong Kong yet. In the view of the author,
even though Hong Kong has a relatively small procurement market, it combines the features of a
clean and effective government and a highly internationalised procurement market, and thus makes
an interesting subject of study. In this article, the author examines the efforts made by the Hong Kong
Government to implement its obligation under the GPA to provide challenge procedures. The article
starts by reviewing Hong Kong’s participation in the government procurement agreements under the
GATT and WTO, and then sets out the general background to the Review Body for Bid Challenges
of Hong Kong. In the next section, the article discusses in detail the bid challenge procedures and
how such procedural rules have been applied and elaborated through the cases that came before the
Review Body. The article concludes by noting that the bid challenge system in Hong Kong generally
conforms to its GPA obligations.
2. A short history on Hong Kong and the GATT and WTO Government
Procurement Agreements
On December 17, 1979, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom sent a notice to the
Director General of the GATT, and accepted on behalf of Hong Kong the Tokyo Round Agreement
on Government Procurement (Tokyo Round Agreement), which was concluded in April of the
same year.5 Hong Kong, widely regarded as the most open economy in the world,6 was one of only
two contracting parties from the developing world to participate in the Tokyo Round Agreement.
After the signing of the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Question of
Hong Kong (Joint Declaration) on December 19, 1984, the United Kingdom decided to invoke
Art.XXVI.5.(c) of the GATT to grant separate contracting party status to Hong Kong by delivering a
3 See, e.g. ibid., section 14.3, National Challenge Procedures, pp.384–405; Arrowsmith, ‘‘The Character and Role
of National Challenge Procedures Under the Government Procurement Agreement’’ (2002) 11 P.P.L.R. 235; S.
Arrowsmith, J. Linarelli and D. Wallace, Regulating Public Procurement: National and International Perspectives (Kluwer, The
Hague, 2000), pp.761–822; A. Reich, International Public Procurement Law: The Evolution of International Regimes on Public
Purchasing (Kluwer, London, 1999), pp.307–312.
4 For the most comprehensive analysis on the remedies and procedures available under the EU regime, see Arrowsmith,
The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement 2nd edn., (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), paras 21.24–21.82. For a review of
the US bid protest system, see Kovacic, ‘‘Procurement Reform and the Choice of Forum in Bid Protest Disputes’’ (1995)
9 The Administrative Law Journal 461; Schooner, ‘‘Pondering the Decline of Federal Government Contract Litigation
in the United States’’ (1999) 8 P.P.L.R. 242; D. I. Gordon, ‘‘In The Beginning: The Earliest Bid Protests Filed With
The Us General Accounting Office’’ (2004) 5 P.P.L.R. 147; E. A. Troff, ‘‘The United States Agency-Level Bid Protest
Mechanism: A Model For Bid Challenge Procedures in Developing Nations’’ (2005) 57 Air Force Law Review 113. For
a review of the challenge procedure in Japan, see J. H. Grier, ‘‘Japan’s Implementation of the WTO Agreement on
Government Procurement’’ 17 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 605. For a review of the challenge procedures in some of the
recent Free Trade Agreements, see J. H. Grier, ‘‘Recent Developments in International Trade Agreements Covering
Government Procurement’’ 35 Pub. Cont. L.J. 385.
5 Communication from the Delegation of Hong Kong, Committee on Government Procurement, GPR/32, May 26, 1986.
Unless otherwise noted, all official GATT and WTO documents are from the WTO website at www.wto.org.
6 Since 1995, Hong Kong has consistently been ranked as the freest economy in the annual Index of Economic Freedom by
the Heritage Foundation, as well as the Economic Freedom of the World Annual Report by the Cato Institute and the Fraser
Institute. Detailed ranking data is available at www.heritage.org/research/features/index/scores.cfm and www.freetheworld.com.
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communication to the GATT Secretariat on April 23, 1986 with immediate effect.7 Fifteen days later,
the Hong Kong delegation sent a communication to the Committee on Government Procurement,
declaring that Hong Kong would continue to accept the Tokyo Round Agreement.8
In 1988, the contracting parties started negotiations for a new agreement on government
procurement, aiming to expand the scope and improve the relevant rules.9 Such negotiations formed
part of the Uruguay Round and were concluded in 1994 with the signing of the new Government
Procurement Agreement (GPA). As a party to the Tokyo Round Agreement, Hong Kong also
participated actively in the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the GPA. During the final stages
of the negotiations, however, certain participants in the Informal Working Group on Negotiations on
the Government Procurement Agreement introduced discriminatory provisions into their Annexes
to the draft Agreement.10 These discriminatory provisions allowed sectoral non-application of the
Agreement to certain named Parties until such time as the Party initiating such discriminatory
measures took the view that the Parties concerned gave comparable and effective access to the
initiating Party’s suppliers to the relevant market.11 In the view of Hong Kong, such discriminatory
provisions constituted derogations from Art.III of the draft Agreement and were a serious departure
from the fundamental principle of most favoured nation treatment.12 Moreover, Hong Kong argued
that these derogations amounted to reservations on the Annexes, which formed an integral part of
the Agreement according to Art.XXIV:12 of the draft Agreement.13 By making reservations on
the Annexes, these parties have violated Art.XXIV:4 of the Agreement, which explicitly prohibited
any reservations in respect of any provisions of the Agreement.14 Hong Kong also noted that, a
few participants had, at the same time or separately, introduced a reciprocity provision into their
Annexes.15 These reciprocity provisions, according to Hong Kong, also amounted to discrimination
amongst Parties and thus violated the principles of the Agreement and the multilateral trading system.16
At the Meeting of the Committee on Government Procurement held on December 15, 1993,
Hong Kong formally voiced these concerns and declared that it was unable to join the consensus in
the Committee on the report of the Informal Working Group on the negotiations.17 As the GATT
made its decisions under the consensus principle, however, Hong Kong’s objection might make it
impossible for the parties to conclude the Agreement, which was a hard-won result of years of tedious
negotiations. Thus, Hong Kong explicitly stated that it would not block the process of concluding
the new Agreement.18 At the same time, Hong Kong also made it clear that it reserved the right not
to sign the new Agreement.19 Moreover, Hong Kong also stated that it wished to reserve the right
to challenge, after entry into force of the Agreement, any measure included in a Party’s Annexes,
7 Communication from the Delegation of Hong Kong, Committee on Government Procurement, GPR/32, May 26, 1986.
8 ibid.
9 For a history on the government procurement negotiations in the GATT and WTO, see G.Marceau and A. Blank,
‘‘History of The Government Procurement Negotiations Since 1945’’ (1996) 5 P.P.L.R. 77.
10 Minutes of the Meeting of the Committee on Government Procurement held on December 15, 1993, GPR/M/50.
11 ibid.
12 ibid.
13 ibid.
14 ibid.
15 ibid.
16 ibid.
17 ibid.
18 ibid.
19 ibid.
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which it considered conflicted with the provisions of the Agreement including through the dispute
settlement process if necessary.20 Of course, as the WTO dispute settlement system would only be
applicable between the parties to the GPA,21 Hong Kong would have to join the GPA before it
could use it to challenge the measures of other parties.
At the meeting of the Informal Working Group on Negotiations on Government Procurement
held on March 10, 1994, Hong Kong reiterated its concerns in a formal statement.22 At the end
of the statement, Hong Kong stated that it would continue to pursue these issues through bilateral
negotiations; on the other hand, unless these issues could be addressed by such consultations to the
satisfaction of Hong Kong, there was a ‘‘distinct possibility’’ that Hong Kong would not join the new
Agreement.23
On April 8, 1994, Hong Kong circulated another communication to the WTO Secretariat, and
announced that, as the bilateral consultations failed to address Hong Kong’s concerns, Hong Kong
would not sign the new Agreement on Government Procurement at the Ministerial Conference to
be held at Marrakesh in April 1994.24
On April 15, 1994, all the other original signatories to the Tokyo Round Agreement (except
Singapore) signed the GPA. Korea also joined as a new Member. On January 1, 1996, the GPA took
effect pursuant to Art.XXIV.1 of the Agreement.
As Hong Kong has one of the most internationalised government procurement markets in the
world,25 the other Members to the GPA still very much hoped that Hong Kong could join the
GPA so that the interests of their suppliers could be protected. In order to give Hong Kong more
time to consider accepting the GPA, the final text of the Agreement included the following special
transitional arrangements for Hong Kong26:
First, Hong Kong could delay application of the provisions of the GPA, except Arts XXI and
XXII, until January 1, 1997.
Secondly, during period between the date of entry into force of this Agreement and the date
of its application by Hong Kong, the rights and obligations between Hong Kong and all other
former Tokyo Round Agreement Parties who also joined the new GPA would be governed by
the substantive provisions of the Tokyo Round Agreement, including its Annexes as modified or
rectified, which provisions are incorporated herein by reference for that purpose and shall remain in
force until December 31, 1996.
Even though it declined to join the GPA, Hong Kong continued its bilateral consultations with the
parties.27 Shortly after the entry into force of the GPA, Hong Kong started to make breakthroughs
in its consultations. For those discriminations specifically targeted against it, Hong Kong had received
20 ibid.
21 GPA, Art.XXII..
22 Agreement on Government Procurement, Communication from Hong Kong, Attachment 2, Hong Kong’s Statement at
the Informal Working Group on Negotiations on Government Procurement on March 10, 1994, L/7445.
23 ibid.
24 Agreement on Government Procurement, Communication from Hong Kong, L/7445.
25 From 1983–1985, Hong Kong only sourced 5.8% of its purchase by covered entities from domestic firms. During
1990–1992, the share of domestic firms in total covered procurement droped further to 3.2%. See B. M. Hoekman,
‘‘Operation of the Agreement on Government Procurement, 1983–1992’’ in B.M. Hoekman and P.C. Mavroidis (eds),
cited above, pp.97–99.
26 GPA, Art.XXIV.3.(a) and (b).
27 Statement by Hong Kong at the meeting of the Committee on Government Procurement held on December 5, 1996,
GPA/M/4, January 7, 1997.
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assurances that they could be removed.28 As to those discriminatory provisions of a general nature,
the Committee on Government Procurement adopted a decision to conduct an early review in 1997
of the Agreement under Art.XXIV, para.7(b) and (c) of the Agreement, with a view to, among other
things, eliminating the discriminatory measures and practices which distort open procurement.29
With these new concessions, Hong Kong considered that the time was ripe for it to re-engage in
the new Agreement. On October 31, 1996, Hong Kong submitted an application for Accession to
the GPA.30 In the application, Hong Kong repeated that its final decision to accede to the Agreement
would be subject to two conditions: first, all the sectoral non-application measures in the Agreement
specifically aimed at Hong Kong should be removed; secondly, the Signatories should agree to
launch an early review of the Agreement with a view in particular to removing all discriminatory
measures and practices which distort open procurement.31 Also, Hong Kong further noted that,
notwithstanding its intention to discharge fully its obligations under the Agreement upon accession,
it would wish to seek to defer the application of Art.XX to Hong Kong by one year in order to allow
time for the setting up of a Bid Challenge System in Hong Kong.32
Shortly after, Hong Kong concluded its accession process to the GPA, which entered into force
for Hong Kong on June 19, 1997.
3. The Review Body on bid challenges
Under Art.XX of the GPA, the Parties shall provide appropriate procedures to enable suppliers to
challenge alleged breaches of the GPA. Such challenge procedure shall conform to the following
requirements:
(a) Measures that could be subject to challenges: the procedure shall be applicable to all
alleged breaches of the Agreement arising in the context of procurements in which
suppliers have, or have had, an interest.
(b) Nature of the procedure: the procedure shall be non-discriminatory, timely, transparent
and effective.
(c) Publication requirement: each Party shall provide its challenge procedures in writing
and make them generally available.
(d) Preservation of evidence: each Party shall ensure that documentation relating to all
aspects of the process concerning procurements covered by the GPA shall be retained
for three years.
(e) Statute of Limitation: the interested supplier may be required to initiate a challenge
procedure and notify the procuring entity within specified time-limits from the time
when the basis of the complaint is known or reasonably should have been known, but
in no case within a period of less than 10 days.
(f) Key components of the procedure: challenge procedures shall provide for:
28 ibid.
29 Report (1996) of the Committee on Government Procurement (1994 Agreement), GPA/8, October 17, 1996.
30 Application for accession to the Agreement on Government Procurement: Hong Kong, Committee on Government
Procurement, GPA/W/28, November 6, 1996.
31 ibid.
32 ibid.
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(i) rapid interim measures to correct breaches of the Agreement and to preserve
commercial opportunities. Such action may result in suspension of the
procurement process. However, procedures may provide that overriding adverse
consequences for the interests concerned, including the public interest, may be
taken into account in deciding whether such measures should be applied. In
such circumstances, just cause for not acting shall be provided in writing;
(ii) an assessment and a possibility for a decision on the justification of the challenge;
(iii) correction of the breach of the Agreement or compensation for the loss or
damages suffered, which may be limited to costs for tender preparation or
protest.
In terms of the institutional arrangement for conducting the challenge procedures, the GPA allows
the Parties to choose to have the challenges heard by either a court or by an impartial and independent
review body. In case that a Party opted for a review body which is not a court, such review body
shall have no interest in the outcome of the procurement and its members must be secure from
external influence during the term of appointment. Moreover, the review body shall either be subject
to judicial review or shall have procedures which provide that:
(a) participants can be heard before an opinion is given or a decision is reached;
(b) participants can be represented and accompanied;
(c) participants shall have access to all proceedings;
(d) proceedings can take place in public;
(e) opinions or decisions are given in writing with a statement describing the basis for
the opinions or decisions;
(f) witnesses can be presented;
(g) documents are disclosed to the review body.
As noted by two leading authorities,
‘‘the nature of procurement is such that most of the time, unless rapid action can be taken,
inconsistencies with the Agreement will de facto be tolerated as firms will not have an interest
in bringing case’’.33
With such consideration in mind, Hong Kong prefers to have a review body rather than a court
to hear challenges as court process can be lengthy, unnecessarily formal and expensive while an
independent administrative body allows ‘‘relatively simple and less formal challenge procedures so
that challenges can be dealt with in a timely and effective manner’’.34 On December 30, 1998,
Hong Kong established the Review Body on Bid Challenges (under the World Trade Organisation
Agreement on Government Procurement) (hereafter the Review Body).
The Review Body is governed by a set of non-statutory Rules of Operation of the Review Body
on Bid Challenges (hereafter the RO),35 which has been subject to several revisions, the last one made
in July 2006. The RO also include three Appendixes, as well as an Annex to the last Appendix. The
33 P.C. Mavroidis and B.M. Hoekman, ‘‘The WTO’s Agreement on Government Procurement: Expanding Disciplines,
Declining Membership?’’ (1995) 4 P.P.L.R. 63 at p.69.
34 Review of national implementing legislation of Hong Kong, China at the meetings of the Committee on Government
Procurement on March 8 and September 29, 2000, GPA/54, June 18, 2001.
35 The full text of the Rules is available at www.tid.gov.hk/english/trade relations/tradefora/reviewbody/reviewbody RO.html.
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government also publishes a Guide to the Review Body on Bid Challenges, which provides a summary
of the operations of the Review Body in non-technical terms.36 Both publications are available from
the government website.
3.1 Jurisdiction of the Review Body
According to the RO, the Review Body may only consider challenges that fulfil the following
requirements:
(a) Launched by a supplier,37 which is defined as ‘‘a supplier or a potential supplier
(of goods or services) who has or has had an interest in a relevant procurement’’.38
Unlike the rules under the GPA,39 Hong Kong does not limit the right to challenge
to suppliers from Members to the GPA; instead, suppliers from economies which are
not Parties to the GPA are also entitled to challenge the relevant measures.40
(b) Against alleged breaches of the GPA.41 In other words, if the complainant only alleges
breaches of the domestic laws and regulations without reference to possible violations
of the GPA, the claim would not be accepted.
(c) In the context of a relevant procurement,42 which is defined as:
‘‘procurements covered by the GPA and referred to in Appendix I thereto
of estimated contract value not less than the relevant thresholds specified in
Annexes I to V of Hong Kong, China’s schedule of commitments under the
GPA’’.43
Under the current GPA schedule of Hong Kong, the GPA applies to the following
procurement activities:
(i) for procurement activities by central Government bureaux and departments, for
contracts of a value of not less than:
(1) 130,000 SDR (currently about 1,499,000 HKD)44 for procurement of
goods and services specified in Annex 4; or
(2) 5 million SDR (currently about 57,636,000 HKD)45 for construction
services;
(ii) for non-Government public bodies, for contracts of a value of not less than:
(1) 400,000 SDR (currently about 4,611,000 HKD)46 for procurement of
goods and services specified in Annex 4; or
36 The full text of the Guide is available at http://sc.info.gov.hk/gb/www.info.gov.hk/reviewbody-gpa/guide/content.htm.
37 r.2.
38 r.1.
39 GPA, Art.III.
40 r.1.
41 r.3.
42 ibid.
43 r.1.
44 Hong Kong, China: The Thresholds in Appendix I of the Agreement as Expressed in National Currencies for 2006–2007,
Committee on Government Procurement, GPA/W/295, December 5, 2005.
45 ibid.
46 ibid.
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(2) 5 million SDR (currently about 57,636,000 HKD)47 for construction
services.
(d) Which is preceded by an invitation to tender or an invitation for applications to be
pre-qualified to tender.48
(e) Issued by the procuring entity,49 which is defined as one of ‘‘those procuring entities
specified in Annexes I to III in Appendix I of Hong Kong, China’s schedule of
commitments under the [GPA]’’.50 Currently, Hong Kong’s Annex 1 list includes 61
government entities,51 Annex 3 list includes five entities, i.e. the Housing Authority
and Housing Department, the Hospital Authority, the Airport Authority, the MTR
Corporation Limited and the Kowloon-Canton Railway Corporation.52 Hong Kong
does not have any Annex 2 entities53 as the Hong Kong Government itself is a
sub-central government.54
(f) After the establishment of the Review Body in the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region.55
3.2 Composition of the Review Body
The RO stipulate that the Review Body shall include 12 individuals appointed by the Secretary for
Commerce, Industry and Technology.56 Among them are one Chairman, two Deputy Chairmen
and nine members.57 No detailed selection and appointment procedures are specified. Neither is
the term of the members provided. The rule does provide, however, that the members shall be
selected from a wide spectrum of society.58 Historically, the Review Body has always included at
least one representative each from the legal profession, construction, engineering or architect firms,
and universities. Of these, lawyers are especially prominent. Among the current membership of the
Review Body, for example, half are lawyers.59 Moreover, in order to ensure the quality of the legal
analysis, the rule also explicitly requires that the Chairman and the two Deputy Chairmen must all
have legal qualification.60 One thing worth noting is that one does not seem to be a resident of Hong
Kong to be eligible to be appointed to the Review Body, as at least one of the Members of the 2006
Review Body61 has no longer been residing in Hong Kong since July 2005.
47 ibid.
48 r.3.
49 ibid.
50 r.1.
51 Hong Kong, China, Annex 1, Government Entities which Procure in Accordance with the Provisions of this Agreement,
WT/Let/491, March 9, 2005.
52 Hong Kong, China, Annex 1, All Other Entities which Procure in Accordance with the Provisions of this Agreement,
WT/Let/370, January 6, 2001.
53 Hong Kong, China, Annex 2, Government Entities which Procure in Accordance with the Provisions of this Agreement,
WT/Let/491, March 9, 2005.
54 According to Art.12 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is only ‘‘a local
administrative region of the People’s Republic of China’’.
55 r.3.
56 r.5.
57 ibid.
58 r.6.
59 The full membership list is available at www.tid.gov.hk/english/trade relations/tradefora/reviewbody/reviewbody mem.html.
60 r.6.
61 Mehdi Mattheo Bushehri.
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According to Art.XX of the GPA, the Review Body shall be ‘‘impartial and independent’’, has
‘‘no interest in the outcome of the procurement’’, while its members shall be ‘‘secure from external
influence during the term of appointment’’. This seems to indicate that it is better to have members
with no links with the suppliers or relevant industries. On the other hand, as procurement activities
typically involve highly technical issues, it is preferable to have members who are from the profession
or familiar with the relevant industries. Thus, one of the major challenges has been how to maintain
the balance between the technical expertise of the members and their impartiality and independence.
The RO achieves this balance by providing detailed rules on how to avoid conflict of interests, most
of which are specified in the Guidance Notes on the Possible and Potential Conflict of Interests (the
Notes). The Notes set out the following disclosure requirements.
First, General Disclosure: all members shall register in writing their personal interest (and those
of their spouses, and children under 18), direct or indirect, pecuniary or otherwise, when they are
first appointed, and annually thereafter, to the Secretariat.62 The registrable interests include the
following:63
(a) directorships or partnerships in companies;
(b) substantial shareholdings (1 per cent or more of the issued share capital);
(c) substantial holdings in land and properties; and
(d) remunerated employments, offices, trades, professions or vocations.
Apparently, interests in companies in some businesses, such as construction or architect businesses,
would have more bearings on matters that might come before the Review Body. Thus, where
applicable, members should also give a brief description of the lines of business of companies in which
they are involved.64 The Notes also recognise that a balance must be struck between the information
to be disclosed so as to maintain the credibility of the Panel and the proper degree of privacy of the
members.65 Thus, members are not required to register the exact amount of remuneration received
or the size or value of the shareholdings.66
In addition to the initial registration at first appointment and regular annual registration thereafter,
the members shall also advise the secretariat about any changes to their registrable interests ‘‘as
soon as such changes have occurred’’ (emphasis added).67 This seems to indicate that the registration
requirement only applies to current interest and does not include past or prospective interests as the
latter interests have either expired or not occurred yet. Thus, the rule, on its face, probably would
not prevent a member from making profits after his term has expired. In reality, however, this would
not be a major problem as any such abuse of power would subject the person to investigations from
the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), which has a broad jurisdiction under the
Prevention of Bribery Ordinance.
Secondly, Case-specific Disclosure: when a matter comes under consideration by the Review
Body, members shall also register their interests. The Note does not set any:
62 r.8.
63 Guidance Notes on the Possible and Potential Conflict of Interests, Note 4.
64 ibid., Note 5.
65 ibid., Note 3.
66 Register of Members’ Interests of Review Body on Bid Challenges.
67 r.8; Note 3.
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‘‘hard and fast rule to judge what should be declared because each individual case is different
and it is difficult to cater for unusual and unforeseen circumstances.’’68
It does, however, give some general guidelines which can assist members to identify potential conflicts
of interests:69
(a) Pecuniary interests such as directorships or partnership in companies, substantial
shareholdings (e.g. 1 per cent or more of the issued share capital) and remunerated
employments, offices, trades, professions or vocations, in a matter under consideration
by the Panel of the Review Body. This list is basically the same as the list for general
disclosure, except that the member should also disclose the interests held by any close
relative, in addition to interests held by the member or his/her spouse, children under
18. The Note does not define ‘‘close relative’’; instead, it should be determined by
the member concerned with due regard to the particular circumstances.
(b) A directorship, partnership, advisory or client relationship, employment or other
significant connection with a company, firm, club, association, union or other
organisation which is connected with, or the subject of, a matter under consideration
by the Review Body. This is broader than (a), as such firm does not have to be directly
involved with the case. Instead, indirect connections might also be considered.
(c) A member who, as a professional adviser, has personally or as a member of a company,
advised or represented or has frequent dealings with any person or body connected
with a matter under consideration by the Review Body, should make a declaration.
This would be most applicable to people who provide professional services, such as
lawyers, accountants, architects or engineers.
(d) Some friendships which might be so close as to warrant declaration in order to avoid
situation where an objective observer might believe a member’s advice to have been
influenced by the closeness of the association. From its wording, this rule does not
require one to conduct inquiry into whether there has been or will be some conflict
of interest because of the close friendship. Instead, so long as such close friendship can
potentially create the impression that the member might be influenced, it should be
declared.
(e) Any interest likely to lead an objective observer to believe that the member’s decision
might have been motivated by personal interest rather than by a duty to act impartially
should be declared. Again no substantive evidence is required: mere creation of adverse
impression is enough.
The Rules do not specify whether the case-specific disclosure requirement shall apply to all members
or only those who are members of the Panel of the particular case. In the author’s view, it should
be applicable to all members because the Panel for each case is generally formed on an ad hoc basis.
Thus, when a challenge has just been launched at the Review Body, the Panel would not have been
established. At this juncture, the members’ declaration of their interests can help the Chairman to
determine which members shall be appointed to the Panel.
68 Note 2.
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Thirdly, Pre-hearing Disclosure: before a hearing or meeting, a member shall also declare his
interests as following according to the levels of interests70:
(a) Substantial direct interest: where a member has a substantial direct interest, whether
pecuniary or otherwise, he/she should declare this and withdraw from the hearing
or meeting prior to the discussion; but, at the Chairman’s invitation, he/she may
make a statement on the subject-matter prior to his/her withdrawal if he/she has an
important and unbiased contribution to make.
(b) Less direct or substantial interest: where the interests are less direct or substantial,
these should be declared but, unless for special reasons he/she is asked to withdraw,
he/she should be allowed to participate in the discussion but should refrain from
the determination on the subject-matter. He/she should however carefully consider
whether or not to abstain from giving advice to the Panel.
(c) Indirect or remote interest: where a member has only an indirect or remote interest
which is unlikely to give him/her any personal benefit and which a reasonable man
would not consider as likely to influence his/her views and judgment, he/she should
be free to participate in the discussion and determination on the subject-matter.
Nonetheless, he should make the interest known to the Panel.
The Rules do not provide any guideline as to how to differentiate each level of interest. Instead, it
also seems to be a matter to be determined largely by the best judgment of the member concerned.
In case of doubt, the member is required to discuss his/her position with and seek a ruling from the
Chairman (or the Secretary for Commerce, Industry and Technology in the case of the Chairman) as
soon as he/she becomes aware of it (original emphasis).71 If it is decided that a substantial direct conflict is
involved, the secretariat would withhold the issue of relevant papers and documents to the concerned
member or request the member to return the papers or other information relating to the matter under
discussion which he/she may have received.72 Presumably, as mentioned above, the member shall
also withdraw from the hearing or meeting prior to the discussion.
For pre-hearing disclosure, the RO also fail to specify whether this requirement applies to all
members or only those who are members of the Panel of the particular case. In the author’s view, it
should be applicable only to members of the Panel concerned because under the RO, only the three
members of a Panel can participate in the hearing and discuss the case, vote on the relevant questions
and take decisions. The other nine members would not be able to participate in the panel process and
thus there would be no concerns of potential conflicts of interests by them.
4. Selected issues in the bid challenge procedures
Since its establishment, about two dozen challenges have been lodged at the Review Body. Of
these, 11 applications were either withdrawn by the applicants or outside the purview of the Review
70 Note 6.
71 Note 7.
72 ibid.
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Body.73 In addition, for two applications, the Chairman considered that prima facie case was not
established and conducted no inquiry.74 This left us with six cases, which are the following:75
Case No.01/2001, brought by Poltech International Ltd (complainant) against the Hong Kong
SAR Government (respondent) concerning the rejection of a tender submission on the supply,
installation and maintenance of a system of Speed Enforcement Camera to the Government of the
Hong Kong SAR.
Case No.01/2003, brought by ATS Technology (Hong Kong) Ltd (complainant) against the
Government Supplies Department, Transport Department, and Electrical and Mechanical Services
Department (respondents) concerning the rejection of a tender on a reloadable card operated parking
system to the Government of Hong Kong SAR.
Case No.02/2003, brought by China Harbour Engineering Co (Group), Penta-Ocean-Paul Y-
BSGL Joint Venture, and Gammon Skanska Ltd (complainants) against the Territory Development
Department (respondent) concerning the rejection of tender submissions on Central Reclamation
Phase III.
Case No.03/2003, brought by Hang Lung Trading (Hong Kong) Ltd (complainant) against the
Government Supplies Department (respondent) concerning the rejection of a tender proposal for the
supply of 174 million tablets of Nifedipine sustained-release tablet 20mg to the Government of Hong
Kong SAR.
Case No.04/2003, brought by Wang Tak Engineering & Shipbuilding Co Ltd (complainant)
against the Marine Department (respondent) concerning the rejection of a tender on supplying a
fire-fighting vessel to the Government of the Hong Kong SAR.
Case No.01/2005, brought by Bondson Technology Ltd (complainant) against the Judiciary
Administration (respondent) concerning the rejection of a tender proposal for the supply of digital
audio recording and transcription services for the courts of the Hong Kong SAR.
Considering that Hong Kong is home to one of the most internationalised government procurement
markets in the world, the small number of cases is rather surprising. In the view of the author, this
could be explained by several factors. First, generally speaking, as the Hong Kong Government
has consistently been ranked as one of the most clean, transparent and efficient governments,76 its
government procurement regime also does not have a lot of problems to start with. Secondly, in
terms of specific reasons, Pachnou’s study on bidders’ use of challenge procedures has identified
several factors which could explain the reluctance of suppliers to lodge formal challenges.77 Her
study focuses on two different jurisdictions, i.e. Greece and the United Kingdom. Of the two, the
study of the United Kingdom experience is particularly relevant, as the legal system in Hong Kong
is largely modelled after the British system. Thus, it is worth considering the factors identified in
this study to see if the same considerations would apply in Hong Kong. According to Pachnou,
the following are the major factors discouraging firms from entering into litigation in the United
Kingdom. The first factor is the high legal cost.78 Given that Hong Kong has a very similar legal
73 Email to the author from Patrick Chan of the Secretariat of the Review Body on Bid Challenges, August 7, 2006.
74 ibid.
75 The summaries of the cases are available from the TID website at: www.tid.gov.hk/english/trade relations/tradefora/reviewbody/
reviewbody hear.html.
76 See, e.g. the annual Global Corruption Barometer, the Corruption Perceptions Index, and the Bribe Payers Index by the
Transparency International, all available at www.transparency.org.
77 D. Pachnou, ‘‘Bidders’ Use of Mechanisms to Enforce EC Procurement Law’’ (2005) 14 P.P.L.R. 256.
78 ibid., at p.258.
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system to the United Kingdom, the legal costs in Hong Kong are also quite substantial and could be
a major deterrent. The second factor is the low chances of winning.79 While, as we can see from the
case law below, this is not exactly the case in Hong Kong as bidders do win in such challenges, the
unwillingness of the government to enforce the recommendations of the Review Body could have
contributed to the reluctance of the bidders to lodge challenges. Thirdly, she also notes that firms in
the United Kingdom generally prefer to avoid litigation either because of cultural reasons, or because
they usually have faith in the integrity of the public sector.80 This is also true in Hong Kong, as
neither the Chinese nor the British culture encourages litigation and the integrity of the Hong Kong
civil service is rarely questioned by the public. Fourthly, she also observes that firms usually prefer to
move on with business rather than wasting resources on litigation, unless the contracts involved are
extremely important, or when blatant and unfair breaches occur.81 In contrast, this factor does not
seem to be very important in Hong Kong. As the review of the case law below shows, the Review
Body is willing to consider even cases of only minor economic or legal importance, and cases from
big and small firms are equally welcome. Fifthly, the firms might choose to avoid litigation for fear
of retaliation by the authorities.82 In Hong Kong, even though the identities of the complainants
are generally disclosed in bid challenges, the possibility of retaliation by authorities does not seem
to be a major concern of suppliers in deciding whether to lodge complaints or not. Sixthly, she
notes that many firms in the United Kingdom are ignorant of the availability of legal remedies for
such breaches.83 The situation is not very different in Hong Kong, where the public is generally
unaware of the bid challenge procedures. Indeed, even among the lawyers in Hong Kong, few have
experiences in such procedures.
In these cases, the Review Body discussed not only the merits of the substantive claims made by
the parties, but also clarified some important procedural issues. In this part, the author will discuss the
procedural rules of the Review Body, with particular reference to the rulings made by the Review
Body in these cases.
4.1 Filing of challenges
4.1.1 Who can invoke the GPA?
The first step of the bid challenge process is filing of challenges. As noted in the previous part, any
supplier that has or has had an interest in a relevant procurement can lodge a complaint. It can be
from any country, regardless of whether such country is a Member of the GPA or not. In the China
Harbour case, the respondent raised the issue of whether the complaints are entitled to invoke the
GPA. According to the respondent, only a country that is a Party to the GPA can challenge the
decision of a Hong Kong procuring entity for breaching the conditions of the GPA.84 Citing passages
from Arrowsmith on Government Procurement in the WTO,85 the respondent also argued that Art.III of
79 ibid.
80 ibid.
81 ibid., at pp.258–260.
82 ibid., at p.259.
83 ibid.
84 At p.18.
85 S. Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO (The Hague: Kluwer, 2003), para.6.2.3., p.59.
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the GPA only prohibits less favourable treatment of foreign suppliers as compared to local suppliers.86
Thus, the respondent asserted that:
‘‘[c]omplaints made under Article XXII of the WTO GPA and based on discrimination under
Article III has (sic) to be made by a supplier of another GPA Party, which is not the case
here.’’87
The author finds such conclusion rather surprising as it confuses the two entirely different dispute
settlement mechanisms provided under the GPA with each other. The first dispute settlement system
is the normal WTO dispute settlement procedure under Art.XXII of the GPA. As the GPA is a
pluri-lateral rather than multi-lateral agreement, the WTO dispute settlement procedures can indeed
only be invoked by a Party of the GPA against another Party of the GPA. At the same time, however,
the WTO dispute settlement system could only be invoked by governments of its Members. Thus,
it is wrong to state that ‘‘[c]omplaints made under Article XXII of the WTO GPA (. . .) has to be
made by a supplier of another GPA Party’’ (emphasis added) as a supplier, by definition, is a private
party, and thus is not eligible to invoke the Art.XXII procedures. The second dispute settlement
system is the bid challenge procedure under Art.XX of the GPA. This is a private enforcement
mechanism and by definition can be used by private parties, i.e. suppliers. While the author agrees that
Art.III only provides legal basis for discrimination claims by foreign suppliers rather than by domestic
suppliers, it is an entirely different matter as to whether a domestic supplier has the standing to make
an Art.III claim. Indeed, Art.XX requires Parties to provide challenge procedures to all suppliers,
without differentiating between domestic and foreign suppliers. According to Arrowsmith, this can
be interpreted to mean that the challenge procedures should be available to the following suppliers:88
(a) suppliers of other GPA Parties;
(b) domestic suppliers that have connections with other GPA Parties through their
affiliation or ownership, as GPA Art.III(2)(b) prohibits Parties from discriminating
domestic suppliers because of affiliation or ownership;
(c) all other domestic suppliers as well as suppliers connected with other GPA countries,
as per the rules regarding the qualification of suppliers under GPA Art.VIII(c) and the
principle of effectiveness under Art.XX.2.
Moreover, the language under the RO is very broad and suppliers from both Parties as well as
non-Parties to the GPA are entitled to use the bid challenge system. As Hong Kong is a Party to
the GPA, suppliers from Hong Kong should also be included. Had the RO intended to limit the
availability of the bid challenge procedures only to the suppliers from other countries and exclude
those from Hong Kong, it would have explicitly referred to ‘‘suppliers from other Parties to the GPA’’.
Thus, if the respondent was referring to ‘‘complaints made under Article XX of the GPA’’, it has
committed double error by stating that such complaints have to be made by a supplier of ‘‘another
GPA Party’’, as the place of origin of the supplier does not have to be a ‘‘GPA Party’’ nor ‘‘another
Party’’.
Notwithstanding the above arguments, the respondent conceded that it should provide equal
treatment to all suppliers. According to the respondent:
86 p.19.
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88 S. Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO (The Hague: Kluwer, 2003), pp.391–392.
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‘‘Having said that, the Respondent is not saying that without an explicit provision, a Hong
Kong Procuring entity could discriminate against one local supplier in favour of another local
supplier. It accepts that it has the obligation to give equal treatment to all suppliers.’’89
Again the author failed to see the legal basis of the respondent’s conclusion. First of all, as a Party’s
GPA obligation is based on the legal provisions contained in the GPA, if there were no such ‘‘explicit
provision’’, such Party and its procuring entity would not assume any ‘‘obligation’’, and can certainly
do anything it wants, including discriminating among local suppliers. Secondly, as the respondent
has recognised, the non-discrimination obligation under Art.III.1 is largely provided for the benefit
of non-local suppliers. Thus, local suppliers generally would not be entitled to the protection under
Art.III.1. Thirdly, for some local suppliers, Art.III.2 does prohibit the Parties from discriminating
among local suppliers on the basis of degree of foreign affiliation or ownership, or the country of
production of the good or service being supplied.90 Thus, there is, contrary to what is indicated by
the respondent, an explicit provision against discrimination among local suppliers. Again, however,
such obligation does not apply to ‘‘all suppliers’’. Instead, only suppliers providing goods which are
produced in a country that is a Party to the GPA can enjoy such treatment. This has been affirmed by
the Hang Lung case, where the Panel ruled that, as Indonesia was not a Party to the GPA, products
from Indonesia were not entitled to the non-discriminatory treatment under Art.III of the GPA.91
Fourthly, ‘‘treatment no less favourable’’ under Art.III.1 is quite different from ‘‘equal treatment to
all suppliers’’. Indeed, it is perfectly legal, as far as legal obligation under Art.III.1 is concerned, for a
Party to treat all suppliers unequally by giving better treatment to foreign suppliers.
The Panel could have well taken this opportunity to set the legal rules straight by discussing these
important issues. Unfortunately, the Panel deemed this to be unnecessary. According to the Panel,
the concession made by the respondent in its submissions and the concession made by the explicit
terms in the Notes for Tenders in this case are enough. As the author discussed above, however,
the concession made by the respondent in its submissions is rather problematic. As to the concession
made by the explicit terms of para.C(1) of the Notes for Tenders, even though it states that ‘‘the
provisions of the WTO GPA will apply to this tender’’ and any ‘‘supplier’’ may lodge a complaint
with the Review Body, any such concession would be confined to the current case as the Notes for
Tenders is applicable only to the tender which is at issue in this case. The Panel also quoted with
approval from the submission of Gammon, another co-complaint:
‘‘A central objective of GPA is to ensure fairness: fairness for all tenderers—local and foreign, as
well as fairness in the tendering, assessment and bid challenge processes.’’
For the reasons discussed in the paragraphs above, however, it is not entirely correct, legally speaking,
to say that ‘‘fairness’’, rather than protection of the interests of foreign suppliers, is truly the ‘‘central
objective’’ of GPA.
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90 See S. Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO (The Hague: Kluwer, 2003), p.392.
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4.1.2 Time-limits
The RO requires a supplier to lodge the challenge within 10 working days after such supplier knew
or reasonably should have known the basis of the challenge.92 Working days are defined as any day
which is not:
‘‘(a) a Saturday;
(b) a general holiday under the General Holidays Ordinance (Cap. 149); or
(c) a gale warning day or black rainstorm warning day as defined in section 71(2) of the
Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance (Cap. 1).’’93
Under Art.XX of the GPA, a Party may require the supplier to initiate a challenge procedure and
notify the procuring entity within specified time-limits from the time when the basis of the complaint
is known or reasonably should have been known, but such time-limits shall be no less than 10 days.
Thus, the requirement under the RO is consistent with the GPA requirement, as 10 working days is
certainly more than 10 calendar days.
The proper way to calculate the time-limit has been the subject of intense debates in several cases.
The first is the China Harbour case. In that case, after issuing the original tender documents, the
respondent issued on October 29, 2002 the Special Conditions of Tender Clause 2 (SCT2), which
provides that:
‘‘[t]he tenderer shall price [the bills in such a way that the price of the Central-Wan Chai Bypass
(CWB) Works should account for at least 33.7% of the total price, while] failure to price the
tender in accordance with the above condition may invalidate the tender.’’94 (emphasis added)
China Harbour, the complainant, took this provision very seriously and went to great length to
comply with this provision.95 In their original calculation, CWB works accounted for less than the
threshold.96 In order to meet the stipulated 33.7 per cent ratio, they had the option of either increasing
the price of the CWB Works, or decreasing the price of non-CWB Works, or decreasing the price of
non-CWB Works and increasing the price of CWB Works proportionately at the same time.97 After
weighing the three options, they decided that the last one is the best course of action.98 Nonetheless,
there was still a risk: if the procuring entity decides to exclude the CWB Works in the final contract,
China Harbour would sustain a reduced return on the remaining works.99 In order to control such
risk, China Harbour decided to increase the price for the whole project.100 Later, it turned out
that China Harbour was the only tenderer complying with the provision101 and the respondent has
initially recommended the acceptance of China Harbour’s tender.102 At a meeting on February 6,
2003, however, the respondent discovered differences between the tender prices in the submitted
92 r.9.
93 r.1.
94 At p.8.
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tenders and the pre-tender estimate as no other tender satisfied the 33.7 per cent ratio.103 As there was
no evidence of price manipulation by the tenderers, the respondent concluded that the percentage
stipulated in SCT2 was based on wrong calculations and recommended that the Government need
not exercise the discretion to invalidate the tenders which did not comply with SCT2.104 As the
result of such decision, another tenderer Leighton was selected as the successful tenderer.105 Even
though no tenderer was present at the meeting, China Harbour somehow discovered that it was not
going to get the contract and requested a meeting with the procuring entity on February 8.106 On
February 10, the procuring entity issued a letter of acceptance to Leighton.107 On the same day,
China Harbour followed up its request for a meeting and requested the procuring entity to withhold
the award of the contract.108 On February 11, the procuring entity replied to China Harbour stating
that the letter of acceptance has already been issued to the successful tenderer.109 China Harbour filed
a complaint with the Review Body on February 12, 2003.110
There were several grounds for China Harbour’s challenge. One of them concerned the terms
in SCT2. China Harbour argued that the word ‘‘shall’’ in the first part of SCT2 meant that all
tenderers were bound to comply with SCT2 and China Harbour should have been awarded the
contract as it was the only tenderer that did comply with the terms.111 On the other hand, the
respondent contended that the word ‘‘may’’ in the second part of SCT2 meant that they had a
complete discretion as to whether or not failure to price the tender in accordance with SCT2 would
invalidate the tender.112 Thus, they were just exercising their discretion by choosing not to invalidate
the non-compliant tenderers and China Harbour had no basis of complaint.113 To the respondent,
China Harbour’s challenge was in fact a challenge to the criteria laid down in the tender documents
and should have been brought within 10 working days of October 29, 2002, i.e. the date on which
SCT2 was included in the tender documents.114 As China Harbour only launched its complaint on
February 12, 2003, it must be time-barred.115
The Panel agreed with China Harbour. According to the Panel, the language used in SCT2 is
rather ambiguous: on the one hand, all tenderers are required to comply with SCT2; on the other
hand, the procuring entity has discretion as to whether to invalidate non-compliant tenders.116 This
placed China Harbour in a situation of uncertainty.117 Even though the essence of the complaint by
China Harbour is that the procuring entity has failed to adhere to the requirements of the tender
103 ibid., at pp.13–14.
104 ibid., at p.14.
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documents, they could not have known prior to February 6, 2003 that such departure was going to
be permitted.118 Thus, the complaint of China Harbour is lodged well within the time-limit.119
The Panel also noted that, as a general point, time does not always run from the date that the
decision was made.120 If the tender documents include some identifiable inconsistencies and/or
errors, the tenderer should complain about this within the time specified.121 According to the Panel:
‘‘[i]t would not be right for a tenderer to wait and see whether he got the contract and then, if
unsuccessful, to challenge something about which he had known for some time.’’122
The Panel also made clear, however, that ‘‘such an analysis cannot fairly be applied to the present
case relating to China Harbour’’123 as China Harbour did not know until February 6, 2003 that the
respondent was not going to apply the condition set out in SCT2.
The Panel was also troubled by the fact that Leighton’s bid was accepted by the procuring entity
well before the expiration of the 10-day period for bringing a challenge and also after China Harbour
had requested a meeting with the entity. The Panel chastised such ‘‘precipitous action’’ of the
procuring entity as having the effect of rendering:
‘‘nugatory any substantive recommendation that this Panel could make to the effect that neither
the contract should be awarded to one of the Complainants and not Leighton or that in the
circumstances fairness dictated a re-tender exercise.’’124
According to the Panel, such conduct violated Hong Kong’s obligation to provide a fair and effective
means of challenge.125 Thus, the Panel recommends the following:
‘‘in all tenders subject to the GPA, no letter of acceptance be sent, or any other legally
binding act done until, at the very least, the 10 day period for bringing bid challenges has
expired. If necessary, such a proviso should be made explicit in the tender documents. Further,
consideration should be given to holding the status quo while a challenge is pending.’’126
While the author has every reason to believe that this recommendation is well-intentioned, the author
wonders whether the Panel has considered the broader implications of this recommendation. First of
all, this requirement imposes additional obligation on Hong Kong beyond the normal requirement
under the GPA. As noted by Arrowsmith, even though Art.XX.2 does require Parties to provide
‘‘effective procedures’’, such abstract principle cannot be enforced on the basis of this provision
alone.127 Instead, the requirement of effectiveness applies only to the extent that the other provisions
in Art.XX spell out more specific obligations.128 Also, such an approach might tie up the hands
of Hong Kong in negotiations and unduly interfere with the discretion the government has in
formulating trade policies. Secondly, as Art.XX has already required the provision of rapid interim
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measures to correct breaches of the GPA, it is unnecessary to require that the contracts shall not be
awarded until after certain number of days. Moreover, even though the time for bringing a challenge
does not always run from the date of awarding the contract, in many cases, it could be used as a good
reference point. In such cases, until the award has been formally made, the unsuccessful tenderers
generally would not be able to find out that they have lost the bid or start trying to identify breaches
in the procedures. Thus, requiring an extra 10 days could be detrimental rather than beneficial
to protecting the interests of bidders. Given the small number of challenges so far, it would be
‘‘disproportionate’’, as noted by a leading authority, to ‘‘require a delay before every contract simply
because of the remote possibility of challenge’’.129
The Panel’s recommendation in this case is very similar to the approach taken by the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) in the well-known Alcatel130 and Commission v Austria131 cases, even though
there was no direct reference to these two cases in the Panel report. According to the interpretation
of Art.2(1) of the EU Remedies Directive132 by the ECJ in these two cases, there must be a standstill
period between the award decision and the conclusion of the contract to provide the unsuccessful
bidders with meaningful opportunities to initiate the review procedures.133 One thing the two
decisions did not make clear is whether such obligation is mandatory even for states where the
national courts have the power to set aside contracts and there are different opinions. According to
Arrowsmith,
‘‘a system that provides for the possibility of suspending or setting aside concluded contracts
for a reasonable period after the tenderers are informed of the award also provides an effective
opportunity to challenge an award decision’’
and thus should be sufficient.134 Timmermans and Gelders, however, argue that the ECJ ‘‘favours a
preventive system of judicial protection by imposing remedies to be available prior to entering into
any contract’’ as this preserves the certainty of contract and provides ‘‘judicial security which will
benefit both the contracting authorities and the contractors’’.135 While the author tends to agree
with Arrowsmith on this point, for the reasons listed above, the author is of the view that, the
introduction of a mandatory standstill requirement in all cases, with or without allowances for other
equally effective alternatives, is not a good policy choice.136
129 S. Arrowsmith, ‘‘The Past and Future Evolution of EC Procurement Law: From Framework to Common Code?’’ 35
Public Contract Law Journal 337 at p.378. See also S. Arrowsmith, ‘‘Implementation of the New EC Procurement Directives
and the Alcatel Ruling in England and Wales and Northern Ireland: A Review of the New Legislation and Guidance’’
(2006) 15 P.P.L.R. 86 at p.132.
130 Case C-81/98, Alcatel Austria v Bundeministerium fu¨r Wissenschaft und Verkehr [1999] E.C.R. I-7671, ECJ. For a discussion
on this case, see C. Davis, ‘‘The European Court of Justice Decision in Alcatel—The Implications in The United Kingdom
for Procurement Remedies and PFI’’ (2002) 11 P.P.L.R. 282.
131 Case C-212/02, Commission v Austria, ECJ judgment of June 24, 2004, not yet reported in E.C.R. For a discussion on this
case, see M. Dischendorfer and S. Arrowsmith, ‘‘Case C-212/05, Commission v Austria: The Requirement for Effective
Remedies to Challenge an Award Decision’’ (2004) 13 P.P.L.R. NA165.
132 Council Directive 89/665 on the co-ordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the
application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts, [1989] O.J. L395/33.
133 See S. Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement, paras 21.33, 21.70. See also W. Timmermans and M.
Gelders, Standstill Obligations in European and Belgian Public Procurement Law (2005) 14 P.P.L.R. 265 at pp.268–269.
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cited above.
135 W. Timmermans and M. Gelders, cited above, pp.269–270.
136 See S. Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement, para. 21.73.
(2007) 16 P.P.L.R. Issue 4  Sweet & Maxwell and contributors
230 (2007) 16 Public Procurement Law Review
Even if a challenge is filed after the 10-working-day time-limit, the RO still allows the Chairman
to receive and consider such late challenge if he finds that reasonable cause for the delay is shown.137
However, if the challenge is filed later than 30 working days after the complainant knew or reasonably
should have known the basis of the challenge, it shall not be considered.
In order to determine the expiration of the 30-day limit, one has to first find out when the time
starts to run. This issue has been subject to frequent debate among the parties in many cases. In
the Hang Lung case, for example, the respondents argued that, as the complainant already knew on
December 20, 2002 that it would not satisfy some of the terms in the Conditions of Tender, its
complaint, which was filed on February 17, 2003, was lodged later than 30 working days after the
complainant knew or reasonably should have known the basis of the challenge, thus shall not be
considered.138 The Panel disagreed, however. According to the Panel, the ‘‘basis of the challenge’’, as
mentioned in RO 9 and 12, shall refer to ‘‘all of the bases’’.139 In the current case, the complainant did
not know of all of the bases until it received the letter dated February 11, 2003 from the respondents
notifying it of all of the reasons for the rejection of its tender.140 Thus, the time did not start running
until February 11, 2003 and the complaint was lodged within the time-limit.141 While the Panel did
not state whether the term ‘‘all the bases’’ refers to factual bases, legal bases, or both, the facts of the
case suggest that it should refer to factual bases only as the letter dated February 11, 2003 from the
respondents lists only factual reasons why the bid from the complainant was not selected.142 Thus,
Hang Lung left open the question whether unawareness of the legal bases for the complaint could be
used to justify late submissions. This issue was dealt with by the Wang Tak case.
In the Wang Tak case, the respondent sent the letter of rejection to the complainant on June 11,
2003.143 The complainant subsequently launched its challenge on July 8, 2003.144 The respondent
alleged that the complaint should be time barred as the 10-day limit has long passed.145 The
complainant responded by arguing that, while it was notified of the rejection on June 11, it required
time to assess its position and obtain legal advice.146 Thus, it did not become aware of the breach
of the GPA until June 16.147 The Panel agreed that the three business days from June 11–16, 2003
was reasonable time for Wang Tak to seek advice of its counsel and confirm its position.148 Thus,
the Panel concluded that the challenge was not time-barred.149 While the author agrees with the
Panel that, in this particular case, three business days is probably a reasonable period of time for the
complainant to confirm its legal position, the author does not think that, as a general principle, granting
grace periods for suppliers to sort out their legal position in every case is a good idea. In the view of the
author, the factual bases and legal bases of a complaint are of different natures and should be dealt with
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differently: the factual bases for the contract award are usually known only to the procuring entities,
and the suppliers generally can do nothing but wait passively for the detailed explanation from the
procuring entities; on the other hand, once the suppliers get hold of the factual information, it is up
to themselves and their lawyers to try to identify and formulate the legal bases for challenging such
awards. If they missed the deadline because they did a lousy job of putting together their legal case,
they should not be allowed extra time as this would be unfair to both the procuring entities and the
winning suppliers. Another problem with the Panel’s reasoning is that, even if we take June 16 as the
date on which the complainant became aware of the breach, neither the complainant nor the Panel
has provided the ‘‘reasonable cause for the delay’’ from June 16 to July 8, which was required by r.12
in order to accept challenges filed after the 10-day limit but before the expiration of the 30-day limit.
In other words, the Panel only discussed the ‘‘reasonable cause for the delay’’ before the complainant
became aware of the basis of the complaint, but failed to discuss the ‘‘reasonable cause for the delay’’
after the complainant became aware of the basis of the complaint.
In previous versions of the RO, the absolute time-limit under r.12 was ‘‘30 days’’ rather than
‘‘30 working days’’. This became an issue in the Bondson case. In that case, the respondent issued
the letter of rejection to the complainant on September 28, 2004, and further wrote on October
8 to explain the reasons for the rejection.150 On October 29, 2004, the respondent identified the
successful tenderers to the complainant.151 On November 8, the complainant lodged their challenge
at the Review Body.152 At the hearing, the respondent requested the Panel to dismiss the complaint
as the extended limit of 30 days has expired.153
In its ruling, the Panel noted that, even though the Chairman had power until r.12 to consider
a late challenge application, he had no power to consider it if it was lodged later than 30 days after
the complainant knew or reasonably should have known the basis of the challenge.154 In order to
determine whether the complaint was launched in time, the Panel had to first ascertain the date on
which the complainant knew or reasonably should have known the basis of the challenge. There are
three possible dates: September 28, or the date of the issuance of the letter of rejection; October 8,
or the date the issuance of the letter explaining the reasons for the rejection; and October 29, or
the date on which the successful tenderers are identified. Comparing the grounds of complaint by
the complainant and the reasons given by the respondent in their letter, the Panel concluded that
the appropriate date should be the date on which the complainant received the letter of reasons.155
However, there was no evidence on when the complainant received the letter.156 It could be on
October 8, i.e. the same day the letter was sent, or any day thereafter.157 Assuming the letter was
received on the same day, the Panel stated that the 30-day period would have expired on November
7.158 However, November 7 was a Sunday and no challenge application could have been lodged on
that day.159 Under r.9, only working days are counted so that a Sunday would not be included.160
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Rule 12, on the other hand, does not contain any reference to such situation. The question then
boils down to whether November 7 should be counted for the purpose of r.12. Citing examples from
both legislations and case law on this issue, the Panel concluded that:
‘‘fairness and common sense as well as predictability dictate the exclusion of the last day which
is a public or general holiday as part of the limitation period’’;
otherwise, the Panel reasoned, ‘‘it becomes simply a matter of luck whether a party would be given
a full 30 days to pursue his challenge’’.161 Another possibility is that the complainant did not receive
the letter until October 9, which the Panel deemed to be a ‘‘safe assumption’’.162 In that case, even
if November 7 is counted, the challenge would still be within the time in which the Chairman may
exercise his discretion under r.12.163 As to the ‘‘reasonable cause for the delay’’, the complainant
submitted that they used the time to consult with lawyers to ascertain the legal basis to lodge a
challenge and negotiate with other parties so as to avoid a challenge.164 The Panel agreed that these
should be accepted as grounds for the extension of the time to lodge a challenge application.165
According to the Panel, ‘‘these are not futile exercises to cause delay’’.166 Furthermore, contrary to
what the respondent has suggested, accepting these reasons would not open the floodgate for late
challenges.167
From the above analysis, we can see that so far the Panels have been quite flexible to granting
extensions to the complainant to file challenges and have not dismissed any challenges for failure to
meet the time-limit. Indeed, this is very much consistent with the mandate of Art.XX of the GPA to
provide ‘‘effective procedures’’ to enable suppliers to obtain remedies.
4.2 Format of complaints
In order to meet the time-limit, a complaint shall also be lodged in the prescribed form, which is
available on the website of the Review Body.168 The form includes four parts. Parts I and II provide
the particulars of the complainant and procuring entity, respectively. Part III sets out the details of
the complaint, which includes the details of the procurement concerned, provisions of the GPA
allegedly breached, details of any consultation held with the procuring entity, detailed grounds for
the complaint, form of remedy now required, and whether to request rapid interim measures to be
implemented by the procuring entity. In Pt IV, the complainant is asked to make two declarations:
first, he agrees to abide by the Rules of Operations of the Review Body; secondly, he gives consent
to the Review Body to obtain from third party his personal data, which are considered relevant and
necessary for the purpose of processing the complaint.
As soon as the Secretariat receives the challenge, it will acknowledge receipt of the challenge.169
If the challenge is not lodged in the prescribed form or, even though the prescribed form is used,
161 para.28.
162 para.29.
163 ibid.
164 para.30.
165 ibid.
166 ibid.
167 ibid.
168 Available at www.tid.gov.hk/english/trade relations/tradefora/reviewbody/files/complaint form.pdf.
169 r.11.
(2007) 16 P.P.L.R. Issue 4  Sweet & Maxwell and contributors
The Bid Challenge Procedures Under the WTO Government Procurement Agreement 233
but no sufficient information has been provided, the Secretariat will notify the complainant on
the deficiencies to be corrected. The complainant must submit the required information within
14 working days from the issue of the notification by the Secretariat. Once the complaint form is
completed and all the information as required in the prescribed form is received, the Secretariat will
issue a ‘‘Notification of Receipt of Bid Challenge’’170 to the complainant. It seems that even with
deficiencies, the challenge application would be considered to be filed within the time-limit so long
as the initial challenge was lodged within 10 working days. In the Hang Lung case, for example,
the complainant became aware of the basis of the challenge on February 11, 2003 and filed its
challenge on February 17.171 On February 20, the Review Body requested the complainant fill in
the parts missing from the complaint form before it could be considered as a formal complaint.172
The complainant submitted the detailed content to the Secretariat on March 2.173 However, no party
argued that the complainant did not file its application until March 2 and thus was time-barred.
4.3 Acceptance of challenge
Within seven working days from the issuance of the ‘‘Notification of Receipt of Bid Challenge’’, the
Chairman shall decide whether a prima facie case is established for the challenge to be accepted for
inquiry. In making the decision, the Chairman shall, inter alia, take into consideration the following
conditions:
(a) the challenge is made in respect of a procurement covered by the GPA;
(b) the complainant is a supplier or a potential supplier who has or has had an interest in
the procurement concerned;
(c) the information provided by the complainant discloses a reasonable indication that
the procurement has not been carried out in accordance with the provisions of the
GPA;
(d) the challenge is filed within the prescribed time-limits; and
(e) the complainant has filed sufficient information.
After considering the information, the Chairman may decide to accept the challenge, reject the
challenge, or request further information from the complainant to help him decide whether the
challenge should be accepted for inquiry.174 As mentioned above, so far, two challenges have been
rejected by the Chairman for failing to make a prima facie case.175
One thing worth noting is that the complainant does not have to identify all possible breaches of
the GPA in order to make a prima facie case. Indeed, the Panel has explicitly stated in China Harbour
that:
‘‘once a prima facie case is established, the production of documents may well disclose other
breaches of the GPA which could not possibly have been known by the complainant.’’176
170 This was referred to as ‘‘Notification of Receipt of Completed Application’’ in the July 2000 version of the RO.
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In the view of the Panel, what is most important is that a Panel should not ‘‘straightjacket itself with a
procedure which apes litigation and which is antithetical to the aims and aspirations of the GPA’’.177
4.4 Establishment of the Panel
If the Chairman decides to accept a challenge, he shall appoint a panel to conduct an inquiry.178 After
receipt of the Chairman’s decision, the Secretariat shall inform the parties concerned in writing within
two working days of the following: the decision to accept the case, the establishment of a Panel, and
details of the challenge. If the complainant has requested rapid interim measures, the procuring entity
shall also be informed of the relevant details.
Each Panel shall include three members, i.e. the Chairman of the Review Body as the head,
and two members appointed by the Chairman. If the Chairman is unavailable, a Deputy Chairman
shall be the head of the Panel. In the six cases that have come before the Review Body so far, Mr
Neil Kaplan, the former Chairman of the Review Body and a former Chairman of the Hong Kong
International Arbitration Centre, has been the chairman in four cases.179 In the other two cases, Mr
Frederick Kan, one of the two Deputy Chairmen, has been the Chairman.180
4.5 Decision-making rules
The RO stipulates that the Panel is entitled to perform all of the duties and functions of the Review
Body as well as exercise all of its powers including the power to extend the deadlines in appropriate
cases.181 This seems to indicate that only the three members of the Panel could participate in the
deliberations. The Chairman takes a leading role in the deliberations by guiding the discussion and
helping to form the opinions on the case.182 The recommendations of the Panel can be made on
the basis of either consensus opinions or majority views.183 In the latter case, the simple majority
rule shall apply and all three members shall have one vote each on a question.184 In case the Panel
has three different views on a question, the Chairman shall make a ruling which he considers to be
appropriate in the circumstances.185 In all cases, all opinions or views expressed shall be recorded.186
4.6 Multiple complaints
In every tender exercise, there are usually several suppliers involved. This means that any action of
the procuring entity breaching the GPA might well affect the interests of more than one supplier.
Thus, it is not uncommon for multiple suppliers in one tender to lodge several challenges. In such
177 p.36.
178 r.14.
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case, the Panel can choose the manner in which the challenges are considered: first, the Panel may
decide to hear such challenges together or one immediately after another if the Panel decides that
the challenges arise out of the same procurement or it would be in the interests of justice to do so.
Alternatively, if the Panel considers that the bringing of a joint challenge may prejudice the procuring
entity or the supplier, it may decide that challenges of all or any of the parties represented shall be
inquired into, heard and determined separately.187
The only case that has involved multiple complainants so far is the China Harbour case. In that
case, China Harbour, the first complainant, filed its complaint to the Review Body on February 12,
2003, while the second complainant Penta filed its complaint on February 17.188 On February 18,
the Chairman considered that a prima facie case has been made for both complaints and established
one panel to consider both cases.189 On the same date, Gammon, the third complainant, also lodged
its challenge.190 The Chairman accepted Gammon’s case the next day and also decided to have the
three complaints considered by the same Panel which has been established earlier.191
One of the potential problems that might arise in instances where multiple complaints are considered
by the same Panel is the time-limits. As noted above, a complaint shall be filed generally within 10
working days and in no case later than 30 working days after the supplier knew or reasonably should
have known the basis of the challenge. In cases where there are multiple complainants, assume that
complainant A came to know the basis of the challenge on January 1, but did not bring its challenge
until after 30 working days, say on April 1; complainant B, on the other hand, came to know the
basis on March 25, and filed its challenge on the following day. Can the challenge of A, which would
have been time-barred, be saved by the challenge of B, which is lodged well within the time-limit? In
the author’s view, this should not be permitted as the RO applies to each challenge separately. In the
China Harbour case, even though there have been three separate complaints, the Panel did not have
to face this problem as all complaints were filed within the 10-working day deadline.192
As the grounds for bid challenges for different suppliers might be different from or even contradictory
to each other, the Panel should also be careful to make sure that the claims by different complainants
are considered separately. The Panel was faced with this problem in the China Harbour case. In that
case, as China Harbour, the first complainant, was the only tenderer that satisfied the requirements
laid out under SCT2, the claims of other complainants must fail if the Panel ruled in favour of China
Harbour on that point.193 The Panel realised this and decided to rule on this issue first. It was only
after the Panel has reached a conclusion on this issue that it went on to deal with the other claims by
other complainants.
4.6.1 Terms of reference of the Review Body and Panel
Under the RO, the terms of reference of the Review Body on Bid Challenges are:194
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(a) receiving challenges, i.e. to receive from suppliers challenges made in respect of alleged
breaches of the World Trade Organisation Agreement on Government Procurement
by procuring entities arising in the context of relevant procurements in which they
have, or have had, an interest;
(b) making inquires, i.e. to conduct inquiries in respect of challenges made by suppliers
in accordance with (a) above; and
(c) deciding cases, i.e. to make determinations and recommendations in accordance with
the Rules of Operation of the Review Body on Bid Challenges.
The ‘‘terms of reference’’ issue has surfaced in the Poltech case, even though the Panel did not
explicitly characterise this as such. In that case, Poltech, the complainant, alleged that the procuring
entity breached Art.XIII.4.(b) of the GPA, which the Complainant alleged requires that an award
shall only be given to a tenderer who has been determined to be fully capable of undertaking the
contract.195 According to Poltech, the successful tenderer PSL was not fully capable of undertaking
the contract for two reasons: the first was failure to obtain proper intellectual property rights. In order
to conform to the tender specifications, PSL need to license or acquire a certain technology, the
patent of which is owned by a wholly owned subsidiary of the complainant and has not been licensed
to PSL.196 The second was lack of financial capability. PSL is a limited company incorporated in
Hong Kong with an issued and paid up share capital of HKD $2 only, and had no known financial
capability.197 On the other hand, Poltech’s own tender was rejected by the procuring entity on the
basis that Poltech failed to meet the technical requirements.198 While both tenderers failed to meet
the technical requirements, the procuring entity only rejected Poltech’s tender. This discriminatory
treatment, according to Poltech, also constituted breach of Art.III.1 of the GPA, which requires
treatment no less favourable than that accorded to PSL.199
With regard to the first reason alleged by Poltech, it is somewhat ambiguous as to whether the
Panel shall consider this. On the one hand, one might argue that intellectual property rights issues
does not fall under the scope of the GPA and thus exceeds the terms of reference of the Panel, which
only covers breaches of the GPA. On the other hand, one could also argue that, before the Panel
could rule on whether Arts XIII.4 and III.1 of the GPA are breached, it must first determine the
validity of the intellectual property rights claim, which is the very basis of the GPA claims. Thus, the
intellectual property rights issue should fall under the terms of reference of the Panel. Indeed, the
Panel would have failed to discharge part of its duties unless the intellectual property rights issue is
decided.
Even though the Panel found it ‘‘very tempting’’ to engage in this ‘‘very interesting question’’,
it declined to consider the intellectual property rights issue in the end.200 According to the Panel,
first of all, the Panel is not the correct body to consider such claims.201 In order to make a decision,
195 p.16. As noted by Mavroidis and Hoekman, even though the determination of the capacity of the tenderer to undertake
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there has to be an adversarial hearing where each side will have discovery obligations.202 The Review
Body, however, does not have the powers of a court, such as the power to order discovery.203
Without such power, the Panel cannot resolve complicated issues of intellectual property.204 Instead,
the complainant should try to seek appropriate relief from the local courts.205 Secondly, in this case,
the complainant’s claim of infringement of intellectual property rights was made without having been
given access to PSL’s tender documents.206 This left the Panel in some doubt as to whether the claim
of the complainant is valid.207 Thus, even if it were appropriate for the Panel to rule on this issue, the
Panel would not have been satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the complainant had made
out its case.208
In the view of the author, it would have been much better had the Panel simply rejected the
intellectual property rights claim of the complainant on the basis that it exceeded the terms of
reference of the Panel. First, as a matter of principle, the real issue here is not whether the evidence
in this case is sufficient to enable to Panel to rule on this issue; it is instead whether such issue is
within the terms of reference of the Panel. If such issue is not within the terms of reference, and
as the author argued above, it is not, the Panel should not dwell on the issue any further. Indeed,
by flirting with the issue in its decision, the Panel might risk being criticised for having exceeded
its terms of reference had the case been appealed in court. Secondly, as a practical matter, the Panel
would not have to have gone the extra mile just to justify its decision of not considering the issue had
it first given a clear-cut decision that the issue exceeds its terms of reference. Unfortunately, the Panel
chose to take the long way in the end, even though it came very close to the terms of reference issue
by stating that the Panel ‘‘cannot, and should not’’ involve itself in attempting to resolve intellectual
property rights issues.209
4.6.2 Rapid interim measures
As it is often said, ‘‘justice delayed is justice denied’’. This is especially true in government procurement
activities, which typically involve large financial stakes. In practice, however, legal proceedings might
simply take too long to complete, with the result that it will often become too late to re-open the
tender procedure after the protest is heard:
‘‘either the contract will have been performed already, or the review body will be unwilling to
set it aside because of the damage this might cause to the public interest or the firm that won
the contract’’.210
Thus, review bodies in many countries are reluctant to interfere with contracts already concluded.211
Recognising this problem, Art.XX.7(a) of the GPA explicitly requires the bid challenge procedures to
provide for the possibility of imposing rapid interim measures. The aim of such measures is to correct
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breaches of the GPA and to preserve commercial opportunities. It might take the form of suspension
of the procurement process. Recognising that such measures might not always produce favourable
effects, the GPA also allows the procuring entity to take into account overriding adverse consequences
for the interests concerned, such as public interest, in considering whether such measures shall be
applied. In such cases, the procuring entity shall provide in writing just cause for not implementing
the rapid interim measures.
The RO do provide for the possibility of interim measures. As discussed above, at the time the
challenge is lodged, the complainant is required to indicate, in the Complaint Form, whether it
intends to request interim measures, as well as the details of the interim measures so requested.
Thereafter, the Panel shall notify the procuring entity of the details of the challenge, the establishment
of the Panel and details of the complainant’s request for rapid interim measures.212 The procuring
entity then has the option to make written comments to the Panel regarding the interim measures
within five working days after receiving such notifications.213 After considering the request and
representations made by both parties, the Panel can decide whether to recommend interim measures
or not.214 If the Panel concludes that interim measures shall be recommended, it should make its
recommendation within 10 working days after the day it is established.215 Such decision shall be
notified to the procuring entity and the complainant as soon as practicable.216 Within seven working
days from the issuance of such notification, the procuring entity shall advise the Panel as to whether it
will implement fully the recommended rapid interim measures.217 If the procuring entity decides not
to follow the recommendation, it shall provide the reasons for not doing so, such as potential damage
to the commercial interests of the procuring entity, any other overriding adverse consequences of
implementing the recommendation, or the public interest.218
In the very first case that went before the Review Body, the Poltech case, the complainant requested
interim measures. The Panel recommended the procuring entity to suspend the implementation of
the contract with the successful tenderer pending the Panel decision on the challenge.219 Initially,
the procuring entity refused to accept the recommendation. According to the procuring entity, as
it has already accepted the tender from the successful tenderer, the Government might run the risk
of breaching the contract if it took no further steps pending the outcome of the challenge.220 The
Panel responded by pointing out that this must always be the case, and if the procuring entity
could use this as a reason for not implementing the interim measures, any powers that the Panel
had, be it compulsive or persuasive, would be rendered ineffective.221 Having considered this, the
respondent withdrew their position and decided to implement the interim measures instead.222 The
Panel, however, did not stop there; instead, it went on to suggest a way to solve the inherent conflicts
between the interim measures and breach of contract concerns, i.e. to insert, in all tenders covered by
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the GPA, a clause which enables the procuring authority to suspend implementation of the successful
contract for so long as the contract is subject to a review by the Panel.223
In the view of the author, the problem in Poltech was much more complicated than the Panel might
have thought. The key question here is not whether interim measures can be granted in general;
instead, it is whether interim measures can be granted to interfere directly with concluded contracts. While
Reich argues that the reference in GPA Art.XX.7 to the objectives of ‘‘correct[ing] breaches (. . .)
and preserve[ing] commercial opportunities’’ means that the review bodies must have a discretion
to set aside concluded contracts,224 Arrowsmith points out this is not necessarily the only option as
the same objectives could well be met in other ways.225 Moreover, requiring setting aside concluded
contracts as the only option could run into legal problems as well. First, GPA Art.XX.7 explicitly
permits interim measures to be refused to protect ‘‘overriding’’ public and third party interests. Once
the contract has been concluded, the interest of the winning supplier in legal certainty226 and the
interest of the public to get the much-needed projects done in a speedy manner227 might become
‘‘overriding’’ interests. Secondly, in countries where the government contracts are subject to private
contract law, the sanctity of ‘‘private rights’’ would also make it difficult for authorities to set aside
contracts.228 Curiously, even though the Panel cited in its report to long passages229 from one of the
leading works on suspension of contracts, it failed to cite to the most relevant part of the book dealing
with the legal complexities of concluded contracts.230 Thus, this question is left unanswered.
In the ATS case, the complainant also requested for interim measures. On February 11, 2003, the
Panel recommended that the respondent shall suspend the tendering procedures until the end of the
hearing, which was originally scheduled in April 2003.231 On February 18, the respondent agreed
to comply with the Panel’s recommendation.232 Due to the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS) in late February, however, the hearing did not commence until May 2, 2003.233
On the first day of the hearing, citing to the urgency to have the 1,000 parking meters and system
well tested in order to see what subsequent modifications would be necessary and the potential fiscal
implications, the respondent requested the Panel to discharge the interim measures.234 The Panel
thought that the hearing would be completed soon and refused to discharge the interim measures
immediately.235 As the hearing dragged on for much longer than the Panel had expected, however,
the Panel finally decided to grant a discharge of the interim measures on public interest grounds.236
While the Panel recognised that this was probably inevitable when the Panel was faced with a
223 p.28.
224 Reich, cited above, p.311.
225 Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO, p.399.
226 ibid. See also Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement, para.21.69.
227 S. Arrowsmith, J. Linarelli and D. Wallace Jr., cited above, p.774.
228 ibid., p.785.
229 In pp.28–29 of the report, the Panel cited to pp.772–775 of S. Arrowsmith, J. Linarelli and D. Wallace Jr., Regulating
Public Procurement: National and International Perspectives.
230 ibid., pp.785–795.
231 p.7.
232 ibid.
233 ibid.
234 ibid.
235 ibid.
236 ibid.
(2007) 16 P.P.L.R. Issue 4  Sweet & Maxwell and contributors
240 (2007) 16 Public Procurement Law Review
concluded contract, it also indicated that it would not have discharged the interim measures if there
was a real likelihood that the contract might be set aside by the conclusion of the hearing.237
In the Hang Lung case, the complainant requested the Review Body to recommend interim
measures in the form of suspension of the execution of contract to allow consultations between the
complainant and the respondent.238 After considering the written submissions made by both parties,
the Panel declined to recommend interim measures on public interests grounds, presumably because
the product in the tender is a medicine which is needed for public health.239 This is so far the only
case in which a request for interim measures have been denied.
4.6.3 Panel hearing
The next step in the Panel process is the hearing. The first question is whether hearing is mandatory.
The GPA only provides that participants ‘‘can be heard before an opinion is given or a decision
is reached’’.240 Thus, there is no requirement that a hearing must be conducted in each case.241
Similarly, under the RO, whether to conduct a hearing or not is optional. In the Wang Tak case, for
example, no hearing was held and the Panel decided the case solely on the basis of written submissions
from the parties.242 According to the RO, however, both the complainant and the respondent have
the right to request for a hearing to be convened.243 Such request shall be made to the Panel in
writing not later than seven working days from the issue of the notification by the Secretariat of the
establishment of the Panel.244 Even if neither party requests a hearing, the Panel may also decide, on
its own initiative, to hold a hearing if the Panel perceives such a need.245
No matter whether a hearing is held, both parties can make written submissions. If the respondent
decided to submit a written response to the challenge, it must do so within 30 working days after the
issue of the notification of the establishment of the Panel.246 There is no prescribed length or style
of the submissions. In the China Harbour case, the Panel complained of being ‘‘subjected to far too
much by way of documentation, authorities and submissions both oral and written’’.247 In the view
of the Panel, the points made on both sides could have been made ‘‘in a far simpler manner without
the huge number of documents and submissions’’.248 As a bid challenge procedure shall not ‘‘ape that
of litigation’’, future panels may have to:
‘‘have regard to the possibility of limiting the length of submissions and perhaps oral arguments
as well to ensure that the review challenge procedures within the spirit of the GPA and the
[Rules of Operation].’’249
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The next issue is whether a hearing should be public. Here again the GPA only provides that
‘‘proceedings can take place in public’’ rather than requiring public hearings.250 Along this line,
the RO provides that hearing can be conducted either in public or in private.251 If the hearing is
requested by a party, such party has to indicate in its written request as to whether the hearing shall
be held in public or private.252 Such request is not necessarily granted, however, as consensus from all
parties is required to conduct the hearing in public.253 Not surprisingly, the complainant, by initiating
the challenge procedures, would normally want the hearing to be held in public; on the other hand,
the respondent might have certain reservations to public hearings, especially if its tender procedure
is questionable. In the China Harbour case, for example, the complainants wanted a public hearing,
while the respondent objected to this request.254 Even though the Panel decided to defer to the
respondent and did hold the hearing in private,255 it also made clear its strong preference for public
hearings. According to the Panel, while ‘‘there may be circumstances were [sic] a private hearing
would be advisable’’, there would be no need for private hearing in many cases.256 The Panel gave
three reasons for its preference for public hearings: first, compared to closed hearings, public hearings
are more consistent with the transparency principle, which the Panel regarded as ‘‘the heart of the
GPA as well as the challenge procedure’’.257 Secondly, the interests of justice are usually best served
by public hearing.258 Thirdly, the terms of Art.XX.6 of the GPA also encourage public hearings.259
Thus, while recognising that ‘‘each case has to be considered on its merits’’, the Panel would still
recommend to the respondent that ‘‘private hearings should not be the norm’’.260
If the Panel decides to hold a hearing, the Chairman of the Panel shall fix the date for the
hearing.261 No later than seven working days before the date of the hearing, the Secretariat shall
notify the Panel in writing of the date, time and place of hearing and provide a copy of each the
following documents to the Panel:262
(i) names of the complainant and the procuring entity concerned;
(ii) names of members of the Panel serving at the hearing;
(iii) a written summary of facts together with the relevant documents for the case to be
heard by the Panel;
(iv) a set of the RO (if not yet been given before) which also contains the Proceedings
of Bid Challenges Hearing lodged under Art.XX (2) of the GPA (Annex).
In the same notification letter, the members will also be reminded to make the appropriate disclosure
of potential conflicts of interests pursuant to the RO as discussed above.263 If any member has to
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withdraw because of conflicts of interests and the quorum therefore cannot be met, the hearing or
Panel meeting shall be adjourned unless a replacement member can be identified immediately to
continue with the hearing.264
In addition, no later than seven working days before the date of hearing, the Secretariat shall also
notify the complainant and the procuring entity concerned in writing of the date, time and place of
hearing and furnish a copy each of the documents mentioned above except the names of the parties
(presumably the parties would have already known the names by that point).265 Furthermore, at least
five working days before the date of hearing, the parties shall each confirm with the Secretariat in
writing the following:266
(i) The language/dialect they intend to use at the hearing: as both Chinese and English
are official languages in Hong Kong,267 the hearings may be conducted in either
Chinese or English, or both as the Panel thinks fit.268 When necessary, the Secretariat
shall provide an interpretation service.269 Also, as most people in Hong Kong speak
Cantonese, a dialect of Chinese, the parties might want to specifically request for the
hearing to be conducted in Cantonese. So far, the only case in which Chinese was
used was the Hang Lung case, where the hearing was conducted in Cantonese and
the Report published in Chinese.270
(ii) Whether the party would appear in person or be represented at the hearing: if
any party chooses to send a representative, he shall submit an authorisation letter
specifying the name and personal particulars of such representative. The parties can
also change or add to their representatives so long as they provide an explanation
to the Secretariat along with the particulars of the new representatives at least three
working days before the hearing. Three days before the hearing, both parties will be
informed of the representation of the other side. Once a representative is appointed,
the parties can choose either only to send their representative to the hearing or appear
together with their representative. There is no requirement that the representative
must be a lawyer. Any agent can be appointed so long as an authorisation letter is
provided. Such a liberal approach is very much in line with the GPA, which only
provides that ‘‘participants can be represented and accompanied’’,271 but does not
state that only lawyers would be eligible as representatives. Indeed, one can argue
that lawyers are not necessarily the best representatives as procurement cases usually
involve highly technical issues. In cases that have come before the Review Body
so far, however, the complainants typically were represented by lawyers, while the
respondents usually were represented by the Department of Justice of Hong Kong,272
with the procuring entities concerned also sending in their own people.
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(iii) Whether the party would call any witnesses to attend the hearing: the GPA allows
the parties to present witnesses.273 If they decide to call any witnesses, they should
also provide the names and personal particulars of the witnesses to the Secretariat.
As government procurement exercises typically involve highly technical matters, the
parties usually would call witnesses in most cases. In the Hang Lung case, however,
the complainant chose not to call any witness.274 While the Panel recognised that
they are not obliged to call any witness, the Panel also noted that the complainant has
forgone an important support for its case by doing so.275 Indeed, as the case involves
medicine, which is a highly technical product, the lack of scientific evidence might
well have cost the complainant the whole case.
If the Panel decides to open the hearing to the public, the Secretariat shall also issue a notice to the
public providing details of the hearing at least seven working days before the hearing.276 Any member
of the public may apply for admittance as observers to the hearings either by advance booking or on
the spot.277 Such application will be handled on a first-come-first-serve basis.278 In addition, taking
into account the capacity of the venue, a limit might be set on the number of observers.279
At the commencement of the hearing, the Chairman will start by stating the purpose of the hearing;
a brief description of the challenge; and the method(s) of recording the proceedings of hearing.280
After that, the Chairman will introduce all the parties present, in the order of the members of the
Panel, the complainant and the procuring entity (respondent) and/or their representatives and other
working staff at the hearing as appropriate.281 Then the complainant will be given the floor to make
its presentations, including an opening statement, production of evidence, cross-examination of the
witness, answering the questions from the respondent and the Panel.282 Next, the respondent will
have an opportunity for the same.283 Then the complainant and respondent can make their closing
statements.284 Finally, the Panel Chairman will formally close the hearing.285 Overall, the hearing
process is quite user-friendly and the Rules even cautioned against conducting the hearing with
‘‘undue formality’’ as this ‘‘is not a court of law’’.286
Throughout the proceedings, all parties concerned shall have access to all proceedings,287 as
required by the GPA.288 Also, all communications made by one party to the Panel, as well as all
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communications from the Panel to either party shall be copied to the other parties at the same time,
unless such communications have been duly classified as ‘‘confidential’’.289
The RO does not specify the length of the hearing. In practice, the hearings have ranged from
one290 to five days.291
4.6.4 Stay, adjournment, postpone or termination of the proceeding
The purpose of sending the notifications to the Panel and parties well in advance is to make sure
that they will all appear in the hearing. Notwithstanding such efforts, if any member of the Panel
is missing within half an hour from the scheduled starting time of the hearing, the meeting shall be
adjourned and another hearing date shall be fixed.292 With the help of modern technology, however,
a member does not necessarily have to be physically present at the hearing. In the China Harbour
case, for example, the hearing took place by video conferencing, as the Chairman was in London
at the time of the hearing, which was scheduled at the height of the SARS breakout.293 If a party
is missing, the Panel would have the option of either adjourning the meeting, or continuing the
hearing without the presence of the missing party if it is satisfied that due notice has been given to
such party.294 If any Panel member is unable to serve at a hearing due to reasons such as conflicts
of interest, ill-health or other emergencies, the Trade and Industry Department can either appoint a
replacement or a new Panel.295 Also, the Chairman may postpone or adjourn a hearing if Tropical
Cyclone Warning Signal No.8 or above is hoisted or if a ‘‘Black’’ Rainstorm Warning is announced
prior to or during a hearing.296 As the ATS case has shown, a hearing could also be postponed under
other circumstances, such as the outbreak of SARS.297
If there is a related judicial proceeding or quasi-judicial proceeding, the Panel may also stay or
adjourn the review process on its own initiative or at the request of a party.298 Such period of stay or
adjournment shall not be included in reckoning any period of time prescribed by the RO for doing
any act.299
4.7 Confidentiality
GPA Art.XX.6(g) provides that the review body shall have procedures which provide that ‘‘documents
are disclosed to the review body’’. This loose language left two questions unanswered. First, must
documents be provided by the parties to the review body? If a party refuses to provide certain
information, can the review body compel the party to disclose such information? Secondly, is a party
obliged to provide information to the other party to the dispute? The following part will try to answer
these two questions by looking at Hong Kong’s case law.
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4.7.1 Disclosure by the parties to the Panel
In the Poltech case, the Panel suggested that it has no power to order discovery.300 This, however,
is not entirely correct. The RO explicitly provides that, upon receipt of a challenge, the Panel
may, at any time, request any information relating to the relevant procurement including confidential
information in the possession, custody or power of the parties concerned for the purpose of facilitating
the investigation into or determination on the challenge.301 The parties concerned shall provide the
requested information expeditiously.302
Under limited circumstances, the parties may refuse to disclose information.303 Such circumstances
include where the disclosure of such information would:304
(a) impede law enforcement;
(b) be contrary to the public interest;
(c) prejudice the legitimate commercial interest of particular enterprises, public or private;
(d) prejudice fair competition between suppliers; or
(e) be in breach of legal professional privilege or confidentiality between the party
concerned and a third party (where the party concerned is unable to obtain the
consent of the third party to disclose such information).
If a party refuses to disclose such information, it shall also provide a written explanation of such
refusal.305
Typically, the respondents are the ones who refuse to disclose information, and the excuse they
use is usually confidentiality. The RO provide that a party may request the Panel to classify certain
information in its submission as confidential and would be made available only to members of the
Panel.306 Such request must be accompanied by the following:307
(a) a statement identifying the information to be classified as confidential, together with
the reasons;
(b) a non-confidential description of the confidential information, which should contain
sufficient details to convey a reasonable understanding of the substance of such
information;
(c) one set of documents with the confidential information and marked ‘‘confidential’’;
and
(d) one set of documents from which the confidential information has been deleted.
The RO is unclear as to whether the parties have the right to designate certain information as
confidential or it is up to the Panel to decide whether to classify such information as confidential.
In the author’s view, it is probably too far-fetched to argue that one needs the approval from the
Panel to designate some information as confidential. In terms of disclosure, all that is required under
Art.XX.6 of the GPA is that ‘‘documents are disclosed to the review body’’, while there is no such
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obligation to the other parties. Rule 31 does provide the Panel access to the documents of the parties
by granting the Panel the power to seek additional information from the parties. However, the fact
that the Panel can request and review such information itself does not necessarily mean that the Panel
could share the information with the other party if the party providing the information has designated
the information as confidential. This is confirmed by the second paragraph of r.33, which provides
that:
‘‘[a]ll confidential information provided to the Panel will be used for the sole deliberation of
the Panel and will be kept strictly confidential.’’308
The only circumstance under which the Panel would have the discretion is when, during the course
of the proceedings, the Panel come across some information which, though not designated by any
party to be confidential, should indeed be classified as confidential.309 In such a case, the Panel can
request that such information shall not knowingly be disclosed by any member, the Secretariat or
any person attending the hearing.310 Before deciding whether the information shall be classified as
confidential, the Panel may hear the views of the parties involved in the proceedings.311
In most cases, even though a party might be unwilling to disclose some information to the other
party, when the Panel requested for such information, it generally has met little difficulty. In the
Poltech case, for example, in order to build up its case, the complainant needed to have access to
the tender document of the winning tenderer to find out who it was and what equipment it would
use. The respondent, however, would not disclose such document.312 As this would essentially have
left the case to be argued ‘‘in a vacuum’’, the Panel requested to take a look at the winning tender
and the respondent agreed.313 After doing so, the Panel further asked the respondent whether they
would have any objection to informing the complainant the identity of the winning tenderer and
the equipment that will be used.314 The respondent also agreed to this request.315 Even though the
parties all got the information, the information was still treated as confidential and has been deleted
from the report.316
Even though the relevant information was provided to the Panel, the Poltech Panel did not make
a ruling as to whether the Panel have the power to have the parties disclose confidential information
to the Panel. This issue was not addressed until the next case, i.e. the ATS case. In that case, the
respondent argued that the Panel did not have such power. In making such an argument, they relied
on Art.XIX (4) of the GPA, which reads:
‘‘Confidential information provided to any Party which would impede law enforcement or
otherwise be contrary to the public interest or would prejudice the legitimate commercial
interest of particular enterprises, public or private, or might prejudice fair competition between
suppliers shall not be revealed without formal authorization from the party providing the
information.’’ (Emphasis added)
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According to the respondent, there is a distinction between the words ‘‘Party’’ and ‘‘party’’: ‘‘Party’’
means a government which is a party to the GPA, while ‘‘party’’ means any one other than such a
government and includes a supplier.317 Thus, this Article imposes a duty on the Government not to
disclose to any third party (including the Panel) any confidential information provided by the supplier
without formal authorisation from the supplier.318
After consulting the French and Spanish versions of the text of the Article, the Panel noted that, as
both versions used the capitalised word throughout, the word ‘‘party’’ in the English version is most
probably a printing error. According to the Panel, they deal with the provision of information by one
government-party to the GPA to another government-party or to the Committee on Government
Procurement, therefore the word ‘‘party’’ should be read as ‘‘Party’’.
While agreeing with the final conclusion of the Panel, the author is not entirely convinced by the
reasoning of the Panel. Indeed, the Panel has taken the long way to solve a rather simple problem.
First of all, at the very beginning of the GPA, it has been explicitly made clear that ‘‘Parties’’
as used in the Agreement shall refer to ‘‘Parties to this Agreement’’. Secondly, Art.XIX itself is
entitled ‘‘Information and Review as Regards Obligations of Parties’’. Throughout the whole article,
the obligation to provide information is only that of the Parties, rather than the private suppliers.
Moreover, among the grounds for not disclosing such information is that such disclosure would
‘‘impede law enforcement or otherwise be contrary to the public interest’’. In all likelihood, this
would refer to the powers of the government, as a private supplier would hardly have the expertise
to make a decision on whether ‘‘law enforcement’’ or ‘‘public interest’’ would be affected.
For the ATS Panel, the heart of the reluctance to make disclosure is the lack of trust in the Review
Body.319 In a letter sent to the procuring entity, the successful tenderer noted that:
‘‘some member [sic] of the Review Body are non-government and from companies where the
release of our information may be of commercial value.’’320
The Panel felt uneasy with these comments as they:
‘‘carry the meaning, specifically or impliedly, that this Panel cannot be trusted with confidential
information which may be of commercial value to some of [the] Panel members, who may use
such confidential information for their own commercial purpose.’’321
The Panel pointed out that the Notes to Tenderers have already stated that the tender is covered
by the GPA, which means that the bid challenge procedures would apply; also, rr.31–34 give the
Panel the power to request information. As the winning tenderer must be aware of these provisions,
it is ‘‘most surprising that [they] acted in such a fashion’’ and the Panel ‘‘absolutely reject this
totally unfounded allegation’’.322 In the author’s view, with the detailed rules on conflicts of interests
governing the Review Body (see above), such concern indeed is rather tenuous.
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4.7.2 Disclosure to the other party
Even though the ATS Panel has made clear that Panel would have access to all information, it
still remained to be decided as to whether the complainant would also have access to confidential
information. This issue emerged in the China Harbour case, which, just like the ATS case, was also
a case ‘‘bedevilled by disputes concerning confidentiality of documents’’.323 In that case, due to the
refusal of the respondent to disclose relevant information early or at all, the complainants have been
unable to prepare their cases ‘‘fully, expeditiously and economically’’.324 Trying to set out some
general principle on this issue, the Panel started by noting that transparency is at the very heart of the
GPA and this extends throughout the tendering and challenging procedure.325 Overbroad claims for
confidentiality are antithetical to transparency.326 Indeed, in most cases almost all of the information
relevant and necessary to determine a challenge will be in the possession of the procuring entity.327
Thus, unless there is full and timely disclosure, an otherwise valid challenge might be frustrated.
In this regard, disclosure is crucial for an effective bid challenge procedure.328 Therefore, the Panel
stated that disclosure should be the norm and claims for confidentiality should be rare and limited in
scope.329
Turning to the facts of the current case, the Panel also discussed two specific issues. The first is the
disclosure of the minutes of two meetings, where the procuring entity discussed whether they should
disqualify tenderers who failed to comply with the terms in SCT2 and decided to award the contract
to Leighton.330 The respondent only sent them to the Panel but not the complainant. In the end, the
Panel did persuade the respondent to make some disclosure but this did not take place until at the
hearing.331 According to the respondent, if such minutes were routinely disclosed in bid challenge
cases, those attending the meeting would be inhibited from having free and frank discussions about
the issues.332 The Panel, however, was rather sceptical. As the Panel argued, on the one hand, as
those attending the meetings are senior and responsible civil servants, there discussions must always be
‘‘considered, fair, reasonable, informed and at all times having the public interest firmly in mind’’.333
Thus, disclosure of such discussions would not destroy the respect of the public in these civil servants
at all; on the contrary, such disclosure can even enhance the confidence of the public in them.334
On the other hand, in the rare instances where the discussions did not follow these principles, then it
must be in the public interest to disclose such discussions to the public.335
The second issue is the disclosure of the tender made by Leighton, the successful tenderer.
Leighton regarded such information to be confidential and even threatened to sue the respondent if
the information was disclosed by the respondent.336 The Panel again found this view unsustainable in
323 p.57.
324 p.58.
325 ibid.
326 ibid.
327 ibid.
328 ibid.
329 ibid.
330 p.59.
331 ibid.
332 ibid.
333 p.60.
334 ibid.
335 ibid.
336 p.61.
(2007) 16 P.P.L.R. Issue 4  Sweet & Maxwell and contributors
The Bid Challenge Procedures Under the WTO Government Procurement Agreement 249
principle. In support of its position, the Panel cited two provisions in the GPA, i.e. Arts XVIII(2)(c)
and XX(4). In the view of the author, however, both provisions are at best equivocal as to whether
the tender document shall be disclosed to the complainant. First, even though Art.XVIII(2)(c) of
the GPA does provide that the unsuccessful tenderer shall be given the characteristics and relative
advantages of the selected tender as well as the name of the winning tenderer, the scope of such
obligation is much more limited than disclosing the whole tender. Similarly, under Art.XX(4), the
documentation relating to all aspects of the procurement process shall be kept for three years, but this
does not necessarily mean that such documentation shall be disclosed to the complainant. The Panel
also correctly pointed out that, when they put in their bids, all tenderers were explicitly informed by
the tender document that there is a possibility of a challenge.337 Again, however, the author fails to
see how this could be deemed as the equivalent of explicit consents to have their tender documents
disclosed to the other tenderers.
Venturing further into uncharted waters, the Panel also made clear that it would not just
rubberstamp the confidentiality requests of parties; instead, it ‘‘has a discretion and will exercise the
discretion’’338 by:
‘‘scrutinis[ing] the claim very carefully to ensure that the necessary private and public interest for
which confidentiality is claimed outweighs the requirement for disclosure as part of a transparent
and fair tender processing bid challenge.’’339
The author finds this particularly troublesome. As discussed above, the RO do not give the Panel
such discretion. Interestingly, even though the Panel asserted that it has such discretion, it did not
even exercise the discretion in this case as all the Panel did was trying to ‘‘persuade’’ the respondent
to provide the information.340 To the author, this is a telling sign that even the Panel itself was not
so confident that it truly possesses such power at all.
In conclusion, the Panel encouraged procuring entities to approach the issue of disclosure from the
standpoint that it should be the norm.341 Claims for confidentiality should be rare and made only where
absolute necessary, i.e. limited to those cases where it can clearly be shown that the balance in favour
of disclosure is easily outweighed by the public or private interest of upholding confidentiality.342
Examples of public interests include sensitive contracts or even defence procurement contracts,343
while private interests shall be considered to make sure that commercially sensitive information is not
disclosed to possible competitors.344
In the Bondson case, the Panel seemed to have retreated from its earlier view of its broad discretion
in determining whether the confidentiality claim of the parties shall be upheld. In this case, the
complainant alleged that the respondent had been playing favouritism with the winning tenderer while
having bias against the complainant. Thus, the complainant sought from the respondent disclosure
of the tender proposal of the winning tenderer in order to show that the successful tenderer did not
comply with the requirements in contract schedules in its bid.345 The respondent sought consent
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from the successful tender but the request was refused.346 The Panel made another request to the
respondent and assured them that the disclosure would only be made to the Panel.347 In the end, the
information was provided. Even though the Panel obtained access to the confidential information
in the end, nowhere did the Panel base its request on its discretion in determining whether certain
information shall be classified as confidential. Indeed, the Panel has taken a much more practical
approach and avoided making a general ruling this time.
4.8 Remedies
Under Art.XX.7(c) of the GPA, challenge procedures shall provide for correction of the breach of
the Agreement or compensation for the loss or damages suffered, which may be limited to costs for
tender preparation or protest. While this could be interpreted to mean that states have a choice of
relying solely on damages without the need to provide for set aside remedies,348 both Arrowsmith
and Reich have convincingly argued that the choice is the one for the review body to make, or, to
put it in another way, the states must provide both remedies and they do not really have a choice.349
The reason for this is that, according to the first interpretation, states could well limit the remedy to
tender or protest cost, thus making it virtually meaningless for suppliers to bring challenges. This,
in turn, would violate the states’ obligation in providing ‘‘effective’’ challenge procedures under
Art.XX(2).350
Under the RO, remedies are provided for in rr.26–29. When the Panel determines that there has
been a breach of GPA thus a challenge is valid, the Panel may recommend appropriate remedy.351
Such remedy can take the form of either corrective measures or compensation which will be limited
to the cost for tender preparation or protest.352 Normally the Panel shall make such determination
in a written report within 90 working days after the date when ‘‘Notification of Receipt of Bid
Challenge’’ is issued. This time period can be extended but in no case shall it exceed 180 working
days after the issuance of the ‘‘Notification of Receipt of Bid Challenge’’.
The corrective measures do not have to be re-tendering. As some observers have argued re-
tendering would be difficult to recommend in some cases for two reasons. The first reason is the
problem with concluded contracts. As it has been noted earlier, once a contract is awarded, the
winning supplier’s interest in legal certainty, the interest of the general public in having the projects
completed as soon as possible, and the constitutional restraints on courts to interfere with ‘‘private
rights’’ all make it difficult, if not impossible, for review bodies to set aside such contracts.353 The
second reason was provided by the Panel in the ATS case. In that case, even though breach of the
GPA has been found, the Panel refused to recommend the tender award to be set aside as they were
‘‘not able to determine if ATS would have won the Tender if the Government had fully complied
with the GPA’’.354 This argument is rather strange as the very reason why re-tendering is needed
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is that the Panel does not know who would have won the tender had there been no breach of the
GPA. Unfortunately, the Panel did not elaborate further on that issue. Instead, the Panel went on to
make the following general recommendations:
First, the Government should only appoint properly qualified persons to Assessment Panels to
access technical submissions.355
Secondly, the determination on the confidentiality of any information provided or to be provided
to a Panel shall be completed before the commencement of the inquiry.356
Thirdly, insert in all tenders covered by the GPA a clause which enables the procuring entity to
suspend implementation of the successful contract for so long as the contract is subject to a review by
a Panel set up under the Review Body.357
Similarly, in the China Harbour case, even though the Panel recommended the respondent to allow
the supplier to re-tender, the Panel also recognised that:
‘‘there [would be] nothing that can be done save (. . .) a review of the tender documentation
to see whether this very situation can be catered for in future exercises.’’358
In terms of compensation, the Panel ruled in the Poltech case that ‘‘the cost for tender preparation
or protest’’ actually means the ‘‘the cost for tender preparation and protest’’ (emphasis added).359
According to the Panel, in order to get to a situation where tender preparation costs can be recovered,
it is necessary to have a hearing before a Panel of the Review Body.360 Thus, the complainant should
be able to recover both costs. As tender preparation costs generally greatly exceeds the costs for the bid
challenge, one might worry that this would open the floodgate for cases brought by entrepreneurial
tenderer to recover preparation costs by exploiting small procedural defects in the tendering process.
However, the Panel quickly closed such loophole by announcing that no tender preparation costs
will be granted in this case. According to the Panel, even though there has been a breach of the
GPA, it did not cause the complainant any harm as their tender would have been rejected on other
grounds.361 As to the costs of the proceeding, the Panel decided to award the complainant half of
the cost even though it only succeeded on one of the two grounds it alleged.362 As argued by the
Panel, even though the hearing has not resulted in a re-tender, it is still in the interests of good
administration for errors to be pointed out so that the risk of them happening again is minimised.363
4.8.1 Implementation of Panel recommendations
After the Panel issues its recommendations, the procuring entity shall use reasonable endeavours to
implement the recommendations.364 In order to monitor the implementation, the procuring entity
shall advise the Panel in writing regarding the measures it intends to take within 30 working days from
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358 p.68.
359 p.27.
360 ibid.
361 ibid.
362 ibid.
363 p.28.
364 r.28.
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the issuance of the Panel report.365 If the procuring entity considers that it is unable to implement any
recommendations, it shall also advise the Panel in writing within 30 working days of the reasons for
not doing so.366 The reasons may include, without limitation, potential damage to the commercial
interests of the procuring entity, any other overriding adverse consequences of implementing the
recommendation, or the public interest.
In case of non-implementation, the Panel may, within 30 working days, from the date of receipt by
the Panel of the procuring entity’s decision, make further recommendations regarding compensation
for the loss or damages suffered by the complainant (which will be limited to the cost for tender
preparation or protest).367 The procuring entity shall use reasonable endeavours to comply with any
such recommendation. If the procuring entity decides not to comply, it shall inform the Panel in
writing, within 14 working days from receiving the recommendations, its reasons such as potential
damage to the commercial interests of the procuring entity, any other overriding adverse consequences
of implementing the recommendation, or the public interest.368
These rules seem to indicate that the corrective measures shall be the first choice, with
the compensation awarded only when the procuring entity decides not to implement the
recommendations. Thus, compensation probably should not be included in the Panel report. As
we can see from the analysis above, however, Panels routinely ordered compensation at the same time
they made recommendations on corrective measures. The only exception so far is the China Harbour
case, where the Panel decided not to award costs at the time of the issuance of the final report.369
Instead, the Panel decided to give the parties time to digest the long decision first and then submit to
the Panel schedules for cost claims, which will be ruled on later.370
As the procuring entity had the option of not implementing the Panel’s recommendations, one
might doubt as to whether the Panel decision is binding. In the case of Secretary for Justice v Penta-Ocean
Construction Company Ltd,371 the High Court of Hong Kong ruled that the Panel’s recommendation
is not binding. According to the Court:
‘‘The Rules does not provide for any sanction for non-compliance with the recommendations.
Nor is there a mechanism in place to give effect to this Panel’s recommendation to make
monetary compensation. A simple mechanism would have been to include a provision that
the Financial Secretary shall make this payment within a specified period of time. As rule
29 now stand [sic], it is entirely left to the procuring entity to decide whether to implement
the recommendations to pay monetary compensation to a complainant. The above conclusion
may appear astonishing, but it is the only conclusion that could be reached on the basis of
the language used in Rules 27 to 29. Thus, unlike the Benchers of the Inns of Court, whose
decision will be given effect by the Bar, the Panel has no power or means to give effect to
their recommendations and there is no mechanism in place to give effect to the decision of the
Panel. The Review Body is therefore no more than an advisory body, independent as it may be,
created by the Government to oversee its own compliance with the WTO GPA and to advise
365 ibid.
366 r.29.
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by way of recommendations to the procuring entities within the Government against whom
complaints of breaches of the WTO GPA have been made. ‘Recommendations’ as the word
suggests, are no more than recommendations binding on the conscience only, like a gentleman’s
agreement. Had the Government intended the recommendations to be binding, it could have
used more mandatory words when referring to a recommendation to pay compensation, such
as an ‘order’ or an ‘award’ or a provision that the Financial Secretary shall make the payment
within a specified period of time. In my view, the recommendations of the Panel are not
binding on the procuring entities and therefore not binding on the Government and have no
force of law.’’
During the Review of the Hong Kong’s GPA Implementing Legislation at the Committee on
Government Procurement in 2001, the United States also questioned whether the decisions of the
Review Body are binding on the procuring entities.372 While Hong Kong concedes that the decisions
are indeed not legally binding on the procuring entities, they also claimed to have full confidence
that the procuring entities will follow the decisions of the Review Body in good faith.373 For Annex
1 entities, they are government entities and thus are covered by the GPA and the RO. For the
Annex 3 entities, even though they are private entities, Hong Kong has signed with each of them a
‘‘Memorandum of Understanding’’, in which they agree to faithfully submit to the jurisdiction of the
Review Body, to participate in its review process in accordance with the rules of the Review Body,
and to observe the decisions made by it.374 Also, as the Review Body’s decisions on challenges are
publicly available, such public censure provides an additional safeguard to deter the procuring entities
from not faithfully following the Review Body’s decisions.375
Notwithstanding such assurances, the implementation of Panel’s recommendations still encounters
problems. Indeed, because the government has failed to implement the recommendation made by
the Panel in the first case, which was issued in 2001, the Panel in the 2003 ATS case has to renew its
call for the government to implement the recommendation again.376
Even though the GPA does not explicitly require Members to give binding effects to the decisions
of the review body, Arrowsmith and Reich have both argued that the requirement that challenge
procedures shall provide for ‘‘correction of the breach of the [GPA]’’ implies that such decisions
must be binding.377 Moreover, while one might argue that the phrase ‘‘or compensation for the loss
or damages suffered’’ could be interpreted to mean that states could choose to limit the remedies
to compensation for costs only, Arrowsmith doubted whether this is the correct interpretation.378
According to her, this interpretation would be particularly problematic in cases where the contracts
are awarded by direct negotiation in violation of the GPA.379 As no suppliers would have incurred
tender costs in such cases, no one would be motivated to bring proceedings.380 This, in turn, would
violate the requirement under GPA Art.XX(3) to provide ‘‘effective procedures’’ (emphasis added).381
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In the view of the author, indeed the view that review body decisions are non-binding is hard to
justify. Further support for this argument can be found in the overall structure of GPA Art.XX(7).
Just like 7(c), 7(a) also requires states to provide procedures for ‘‘rapid interim measures to correct
breaches’’. The difference between the two sub-paragraphs, however, is that while 7(a) explicitly
recognises the power of the authorities to decline from applying such measure for particular reasons,
7(c) does not provide such possibility at all. As 7(a) provides the authorities the possibility of not
complying with review body rulings, this means that review body rulings on rapid interim measures
are not binding. On the other hand, as 7(c) does not give the authorities such discretion, this
sub-paragraph must be interpreted to give binding effect to review body decisions.
Unfortunately, in practice, not all GPA Members recognise the binding force of review body
decisions. In the United States and NAFTA,382 for example, decisions of review bodies are only
recommendations which should ‘‘normally’’ be followed.383 Japan also adopts a similar approach,
where the procuring entity could decide not to comply with recommendations of the Government
Procurement Review Board even though it is normally expected to implement such decisions.384
5. Conclusion
As shown by the analyses above, the bid challenge procedure, which is largely modelled after the
procedure for commercial arbitration, is quite sophisticated and has few problems. Even in the rare
instances where there were problems, the members of the Review Body, many of which have
considerable arbitration experience, have been able to solve the problems successfully. The more
serious problems that arose so far are mostly due to the lack of understanding of the WTO GPA by the
members. Indeed, this paradoxical result is the only logical result of the good intentions underlying
the bid challenge mechanism provided under the GPA: in order to protect the interests of suppliers,
the GPA grants the suppliers the right to challenge decisions of procuring entities in domestic bid
challenge procedures; as each Party has their own review body, however, this might well lead to
divergent interpretations on the GPA;385 such divergent interpretations, in the long run, would harm
the interests of suppliers who operate in an increasingly globalised world. Under Art.XXII of the
GPA, interpretations that are inconsistent with the obligations under the GPA could be challenged
by other Parties under the WTO dispute settlement system. Thus, the author believes that measures
should be taken to ensure that rulings of the Review Body are consistent with Hong Kong’s GPA
obligations. For this purpose, it might be advisable to have at least one member of each Panel being
someone with expertise on GPA and the WTO agreements, in addition to two other people with
legal expertise and technical expertise, respectively. Otherwise, Hong Kong might well find itself in
the WTO defending its first case.
382 NAFTA Art.1017 (k)–(l).
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